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Program is deploying the largest enterprise-wide information technology (IT) system 
seen in any public sector organization to date.  Along with this landmark project is a 
multitude of implementation challenges for the Navy to overcome.  The DoN is using 
private industry best practices to establish the Navy ERP Program.  Some of the 
challenges faced by the Navy may stem from the inherent differences between public and 
private sector organizations.  If so, the management of IT system implementations in the 
Navy must therefore account for these sector differences, and cannot fully rely on private 
sector best practices.  This paper will examine the implementation challenges of Navy 
ERP with respect to its public sector characteristics in order to provide a baseline for 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
In an era where the Department of Defense (DoD) must find efficiencies to 
continue funding today’s critical requirements, as well as address the uncertainties of 
tomorrow, business process reengineering (BPR) emerges as the method to eliminate 
non-value added practices and legacy system redundancy in the Department of the Navy 
(DoN).  Since the 1980s, legislation has focused on monitoring and improving the 
effectiveness of internal controls regarding governmental financial operations.  Over the 
past decade, the DoD has been operating within an increasingly financially constrained 
environment in which Congress continues to demand increased accountability and 
transparency regarding the use of appropriated funds. 
During the 1970s, the manufacturing sector increased the efficiency of their 
production lines by implementing Material Requirements Planning (MRP) systems which 
later evolved to Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRP-II) software. The initial benefit 
of these early systems was improved decision-making resulting from improved data 
sharing among the various manufacturing process stakeholders.  Seeing the merits of the 
system, private companies began developing software packages that would allow the 
system to include data from the other existing business processes (i.e., finance, 
marketing, sales, supply chain management, and human resources (HR)).  In the 1990s, 
this new enterprise approach to efficient business management evolved into what we now 
know as Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP). 
In order to comply with existing legislation (e.g., the Chief Financial Officer 
(CFO) Act) the DoN’s Commercial Business Practices Working Group (CBP) 
recommended that the DoN invest in ERP software to manage its resources, provide 
financial transparency, and standardize acquisitions. In 1998, the DoN funded four 
independent ERP pilot programs to determine the feasibility of utilizing commercial-off-
the-shelf (COTS) software to manage the DoN’s financial, maintenance, supply chain 
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management, and inventory control programs.  From 1998 to 2003, the ERP pilot 
programs demonstrated their ability to standardize business processes across their 
respective systems commands (SYSCOMs). 
In 2003, the DoN decided to merge the four pilot programs into one integrated 
Navy enterprise system, Navy ERP.  Under the direction of the Navy ERP Program 
office, the DoN is releasing the program in stages, systematically retiring legacy systems 
while integrating more functions into the Navy ERP system.  When fully deployed, Navy 
ERP could be the largest ERP system in the world. 
B. PURPOSE 
ERP systems are information technology (IT) systems originally developed as 
private sector strategic management tools, but are now found in a variety of public sector 
organizations including all levels of local, state, and federal governments.  A majority of 
the existing research regarding ERP lies within IT implementation in the private sector, 
thus it is logical to see many public sector organizations incorporating private sector best 
practices into their strategic IT planning and implementation processes.  Yet, many public 
organizations have failed to implement an ERP system successfully.  If an existing body 
of knowledge concerning successful best practices and lessons learned is utilized, why do 
public sector organizations fail to implement a working ERP system?  Specifically, why 
are the DoD and the DoN experiencing so many challenges in their ERP implementation 
efforts? 
Our project will look at the ERP implementation challenges experienced by the 
DoN.  A comparison of private and public sector characteristics will help identify 
challenges resulting from any organizational differences.  We will then examine the 
existing DoN IT governance structure, determine its effect on the current challenges and 
overall implementation process, and provide recommendations for potentially improving 
the IT governance structure. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Do public and private sector organizations possess inherent differences in their 
structure, governance, and decision-making?  If so, the differences present specific 
challenges for each organization type, and raise the question of the applicability of 
private sector IT implementation best practices in a public sector setting.  Therefore, 
applying private sector IT best practices will not address the unique challenges of public 
sector organizations.  A public sector oriented framework must be used to examine the 
unique IT implementation challenges which result from the inherent differences between 
the private and public sector.  Understanding the differences between the sectors will 
provide a guide for an analysis of the governance challenges within the Navy ERP 
Program.   
The success of an enterprise-wide program is influenced by several governance 
facets: formal communications, alignment processes, and decision-making hierarchies.  
The chain of command is a decision-making construct well suited for the military.  
However, the cross functional nature of the Navy ERP Program may require a different 
governance structure to effectively implement the program.  Rapidly evolving technology 
and business process requirements of enterprise-wide systems represent business 
transformation challenges never before faced by the Navy, and should require evaluation 
of the effectiveness of the existing governance structure of the Navy ERP Program.  Our 
analysis will examine the implementation challenges of Navy ERP Program with respect 
to its public sector characteristics in order to provide a baseline for developing a 
governance framework for future enterprise-wide IT implementations in the DoN. 
1. Primary Research Question 
What are the qualitative differences between DoN and private sector governance 
structures that affect the strategic planning, implementation, and policy formulation of 
enterprise-wide IT systems? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
 What entities, internal and external to the Navy, contribute to IT policy 
formulation, implementation, and enforcement? 
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 Who is responsible for developing the DoN’s ERP requirements and how 
are they selected to participate? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Our research will be conducted as follows: (1) literature review on the origin and 
development of ERP systems; (2) historical accounting of ERP implementation in the 
Navy from the initial pilot programs to its current state; (3) literature review of public and 
private sector organizational differences and the affect on IT governance; and (4) 
interviews of subject matter experts (SMEs) involved with the governance, decision 
making, and policy formulation processes of the Navy ERP program.   
The literature review will provide: (1) a general definition of ERP and brief 
history of its origins and development; (2) IT system implementation best practices used 
in the public sector; (3) chronological review of Navy ERP systems development and 
policy formulation within the DoN; (4) a framework for identifying unique public sector 
IT planning, management, and implementation issues; and (5) a model for examining IT 
governance structures.   
Using the suggested framework, an analysis of the historical accounting of the 
Navy ERP program will be conducted to identify public sector characteristics that may be 
contributing factors to the Navy’s IT implementation challenges.  The initial results will  
provide the background for the SME interviews we will conduct regarding the existing 
Navy ERP Program governance structure.  Applying the collected data to our suggested 
model for developing IT governance structures, we will identify any strengths and 
weaknesses with the existing structure, and provide a possible alternative for the Navy 
ERP program IT governance structure. 
The SMEs in our study will be solicited from Business Transformation Agency 
(BTA), Program Executive Office-Enterprise Information Systems (PEO-EIS), Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy Financial Management and Comptroller (ASN 
FM&C), Department of the Navy Chief Information Officer (DoN-CIO), Office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) staff, the resource sponsor, and two private sector 
organizations.  The SME share a high level of familiarity with the Navy ERP Program 
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and possess a collective experience base to include other ERP implementations and 
business process redesign efforts in private companies and other federal agencies.  The 
interviews will be used to evaluate our empirical data regarding DoN public sector 
characteristics that could affect Navy ERP governance and provide insight into the 
existing IT governance structure for the program. 
E. SCOPE 
This project provides a policy level assessment of the governance structure of the 
Navy ERP Program.  We provide information on public vs. private sector characteristics, 
existing implementation best practices, and governance theory, to establish a baseline for 
our analysis.  We interview SME associated with the main governing bodies of the Navy 
ERP Program, determine the existing governance structure, and identify differences that 
pose challenges in adopting private sector practices.   Our goal is to provide a baseline for 
researching and developing appropriate governance structures for future enterprise-wide 
IT systems in order to promote effective business transformation practices and efficient 
usage of funds in a highly constrained resource environment.  The IT governance 
framework affects enterprise-wide IT investments and therefore affects the potential 
benefits.  Previous research focused on best practices and implementation methods, with 
little emphasis on governance of the program.  An enterprise-wide IT system will not 
realize its full potential unless a decision-making structure is designed to attain the 
expected benefits. 
F. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II presents background information on ERP including the DoN definition 
of an ERP program, evolutionary development of ERP in the private sector, and 
implementation best practices employed by the private sector. 
Chapter III provides a historical overview of the Navy ERP program from the 
initial pilot programs to its current state.  Major policies influencing the adoption of the 
Navy ERP Program are also provided. 
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Chapter IV provides a framework to analyze IT-relevant public vs. private sector 
organizations, and identifies differing organizational characteristics that produce 
challenges in implementing private sector practices in the DoN. 
Chapter V defines IT governance and establishes the key concepts regarding IT 
governance.  A framework for developing IT governance structures is also introduced for 
analysis of the collected data. 
Chapter VI analyzes the public sector characteristics of the DoN which affect the 
Navy ERP Program governance structure, the existing program governance model, and 
best practices best suited for the Navy ERP Program. 
Chapter VII concludes the project by identifying governance challenges to 
overcome for successful implementation of enterprise-wide IT systems.  
Recommendations for overcoming these challenges, and developing an appropriate DoN 
IT governance structure, are presented.  
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II. ENTERPRISE RESOURCE PLANNING (ERP) 
A. DEFINITION OF ERP 
The American Production and Inventory Control Society (APICS) Dictionary 
defines ERP as a “framework for organizing, defining, and standardizing the business 
processes necessary to effectively plan and control an organization so the organization 
can use its internal knowledge to seek external advantage.”1  From a hardware/software 
perspective, an ERP system is basically an IT system with integrated groups of software 
modules providing management tools for a number of internal business processes (i.e., 
human resources, sales, marketing, distribution, manufacturing, inventory management, 
acquisition).  The software architecture is designed to allow information transparency and 
accessibility across all functions and business units of an enterprise.  ERP system 
implementation is intended to provide a single integrated system, replacing old, 
incompatible legacy systems, 2 and is viewed as “…commercial software packages [that] 
promise the seamless integration of all the information flowing through a company—
financial and accounting information, human resource information, supply chain 
information, customer information.”3   
For the DoD and DoN specifically, the website of the Program Manager (PM) for 
the Navy ERP Program displays the following definition “Navy ERP is an integrated 
business management system that updates and standardizes Navy business operations, 
provides financial transparency and total asset visibility across the enterprise, and 
                                                 
1 Robert Jacobs and Ted Weston Jr., “Enterprise resource planning (ERP) - A brief history,” Journal 
of Operations Management 25, no. 207 (December 2006): 357. 
2 Mohammad A. Rashid et al., “The Evolution of ERP Systems: A Historical Perspective,” in 
Enterprise Resource Planning Solutions & Management, ed. Fiona Fui-Hoon Nah (Hershey, PA: IRM 
Press, 2002), 35–50. 
3 Thomas H. Davenport, “Putting the Enterprise into the Enterprise System,” Harvard Business 
Review 76, no. 4 (July-August 1998):121–131, http://www.jps-
dir.net/Forum/uploads/12967/Davenport_1998.pdf. 
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increases effectiveness and efficiency.”4  The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the 
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Figure 1.   ASN-FMC, Office of Financial Operations ERP Definition5 
B. ORIGINS OF ERP 
Computing technology and ERP development have moved in lockstep for the past 
fifty years.  Our historical accounting of ERP dates back to the early 1960s when the 
concept of ERP and its required technology were not even in existence.  The predecessor 
of today’s modern ERP system was MRP.  MRP was born out of necessity as 
manufacturing organizations needed to improve on the ability to forecast future material 
                                                 
4 Navy ERP Program Office, “About Navy ERP,” Navy ERP Program, 
http://www.erp.navy.mil/about_erp.html. 
5 Beverly Veit, “Navy ERP: Where We've Been-Where We're Going,” Office of the Assistant 
Secretary  of the Navy - Financial Management and Comptroller (June 2010), 
http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/fmc/PDI_2010/N-ERP%20Been%20&%20Going.ppt. 
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requirements.  Determining material requirements manually yielded inaccurate results 
leading to excessive inventory of unwanted materials, inadequate inventory of needed 
materials, and exponentially increasing lead times for product delivery.6  
One of the early projects to address the material requirements issue was a joint 
venture between International Business Machines (IBM) and JJ Chase, a heavy 
equipment manufacturer, seeking to provide a computerized solution for the firm’s 
manufacturing and planning control requirements (e.g., economic order quantity, re-order 
point, safety stock, and inventory on hand).7  Although computing capability in the 1960s 
was limited, the early MRP systems sufficed to fulfill the requirements identified in the 
manufacturing strategies implemented by many production firms.  However, large scale 
implementation in the manufacturing industry was not feasible because the mainframe 
systems of the time were expensive and required an extensive amount of human capital 
investment to maintain the continued operations for collecting, retaining, and storing the 
data being generated.8 
The development of random access memory (RAM) sparked the next 
evolutionary step on the path from MRP to ERP.  During the late 1960s, a large amount 
of research was committed to proving the theoretical efficiency to be gained from using 
RAM chips over magnetic tape media.  Then in 1968, Robert Heath Dennard patented the 
first single transistor Dynamic RAM (DRAM) chipset.  Dennard’s chips allowed smaller 
computers to compute more complex functions with less energy requirements and 
eventually became a standard for the computer industry by the mid 1970s. 9  The DRAM 
chipset allowed for faster operations and provided higher capacity memory storage, 
                                                 
6 Jos Peeters, “Early MRP Systems at Royal Philips Electronics in the 1960s and 1970s,” IEEE Annals 
of the History of Computing 31, no. 2 (April-June 2009): 58, 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5070066&tag=1. 
7 Robert Jacobs and Ted Weston Jr., “Enterprise resource planning (ERP) - A brief history,” Journal 
of Operations Management 25, no. 207 (December 2006): 358. 
8 Peeters, Early MRP Systems, 58. 
9 Massachusetts Institute of Technology School of Engineering, “Inventor of the Week: Archive - 
Robert Dennard,” Lemelson-MIT program, (July 2005), http://web.mit.edu/invent/iow/dennard.html. 
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therefore enabling the development of IT hardware able to incorporate a larger scale of 
complex business operations than previously possible with mainframe systems.10 
During the 1970s, the advances in technology pushed MRP systems to the 
forefront of inventory management, therefore providing greater controls over plant-wide 
planning and operations. 11  The ability for MRP systems to integrate information from 
multiple manufacturing processes (e.g. forecasting, scheduling, and production) allowed 
companies to develop new strategies for diversifying their products and entering new 
markets.  In 1972, IBM published a series of books on its Communications-Oriented 
Production Information and Control System (COPICS), which outlined what eventually 
become today’s ERP systems (Figure 2).  This decade also saw the emergence of several 
companies who would rise to become today’s modern day ERP systems vendors (i.e., 
Oracle, Baan, J.D. Edwards, and Systems, Applications, and Products in Data Processing 
Corporation (SAP)). 12 
                                                 
10 Robert Jacobs and Ted Weston Jr., “Enterprise resource planning (ERP) - A brief history,” Journal 
of Operations Management 25, no. 207 (December 2006): 358. 
11 Jos Peeters, “Early MRP Systems at Royal Philips Electronics in the 1960s and 1970s,” IEEE 
Annals of the History of Computing 31, no. 2 (April-June 2009): 59–61, 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5070066&tag=1. 
12 Jacobs, ERP History, 358 –359. 
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Figure 2.   Functional Content of COPICS13 
By the 1980s, improved hardware and increased computing and integrating 
capabilities moved MRP to its next stage of development, shifting from MRP to MRP-II.  
The hardware advances allowed for the development of software which could incorporate 
the MRP-II processes into all of a company’s business units (manufacturing, HR, payroll, 
accounting) providing an opportunity for real-time data interchange and improved 
                                                 
13 Jos Peeters, “Early MRP Systems at Royal Philips Electronics in the 1960s and 1970s,” IEEE 
Annals of the History of Computing 31, no. 2 (April-June 2009): 60, 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5070066&tag=1. 
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accessibility of information in support of strategic decision making.14  By the close of the 
1980s, IBM, the dominant hardware provider of the time, introduced the Computer 
Integrated Manufacturing (CIM) framework, whose scope would eventually become the 
entire business enterprise, thus outlining the progression to today’s ERP systems. 
The Gartner Group is credited with coining the term ERP in the early 1990s and 
promoting the importance of horizontal and vertical integration of software throughout all 
of an enterprise’s business units.15  This evolutionary view of coordinating all business 
functions pushed SAP, Oracle, JD Edwards, Peoplesoft, and Baan to create software 
packages that capitalized on new client-server architectures with the ability to allow 
multiple terminals to share the computing load, thus signaling the move away from 
mainframe systems.  However, it was the year 2000 (Y2K) dilemma that ushered in 
unprecedented growth in the development of ERP software and IT systems of the 1990s.  
The possibility of non-Y2K compliant legacy systems failing at the turn of the century 
resulted in the adoption of ERP by many enterprises.16 
After Y2K, the bursting of the dot-com bubble ushered in a consolidation of 
software vendors with SAP and Oracle becoming the major players of the 2000s.  
Though the technological aspects of ERP have developed considerably over the last 
several decades, the theories underlying successful implementation and application are 
still in their infancy.  This is highly evident when exploring ERP challenges away from 
traditional business enterprises (i.e., private sector companies) and will be addressed in 
this paper. 
C. ERP IMPLEMENTATION BEST PRACTICES 
Independent of sector, ERP implementation poses challenges for even the best run 
organizations.  ERP in both the public and private sectors is difficult to implement for 
multiple reasons.  Competing resources, changing priorities, and personnel shifts are just 
three very broad issues that management must overcome on a continuing basis.  ERP 
                                                 
14 Robert Jacobs and Ted Weston Jr., “Enterprise resource planning (ERP) - A brief history,” Journal 
of Operations Management 25, no. 207 (December 2006): 359–360. 
15 Jacobs, ERP History, 361. 
16 Jacobs, ERP History, 361–362. 
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programs are expensive to plan and implement, thus the cost must be weighed against the 
benefits.  Many times, the cost of ERP technology is not always justified, especially for 
small companies.  Furthermore, the numerous ERP failures along with the large initial 
investment of capital required to start a program must be rationalized before an 
organization can successfully plan to implement an ERP program.17 
Research into these failures and successes has resulted in many researchers 
providing varying theories on ERP best practices.  The cumulative findings of these 
theories identify the top private ERP implementation best practices (Table 1). 
 
Table 1.   Private ERP Implementation Best Practices18 
ERP Teamwork and Composition is the most noted factor in the successful 
implementation of ERP in the private sector.  The team’s only task is ERP 
implementation.  The company must assign their top technical and business personnel to 
work in conjunction with the software consultants to deliver the most effective ERP 
program to the company.19  Regular meetings and incentives will assist with team 
cohesiveness and speed of implementation. 
                                                 
17 Christopher P. Holland and Ben Light, “A critical success factors model for ERP implementation,” 
IEEE Software 16, no. 3 (May 1999): 30. 
18 Fiona Fui-Hoon Nah et al., “Critical factors for successful implementation of enterprise systems,” 
Business Process Management Journal 7, no. 3 (2001): 288. 
19 Nah, Critical factors, 289. 
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Change Management Program and Culture is essential to ensure that all users of 
the new ERP software have a stake in the design and training.  Users must be consulted 
and educated on the improvements and benefits that the ERP software will have over 
their legacy system.  Their inputs during the design phase and training during the 
implementation phase will ease the ERP transition.20  Continuous business process 
training and support will be required even after the ERP software is successfully 
implemented. 
Top Management Support is crucial to the successful implementation process.  
ERP needs to be viewed by all as a strategic goal.21  Management ensures success by 
publicly confirming ERP as a top priority as well as reinforcing it through policy 
changes, personnel involvement, and sufficient allocation of resources. 
Business Plan and Vision is essential for establishing an ERP roadmap and 
strategy for the stakeholders to follow.  The plan identifies the problems, solutions, 
resources, and risk.  It considers the complexity of legacy systems and the resulting 
implementation stages required.22  The vision explains how the business will improve 
and establishes employee expectations to ensure a successful ERP implementation. 
BPR and Minimum Customization are important to ensure that the ERP software 
requires the minimum number of changes to work within the business process.  Current 
business processes must change to fit the ERP software so that all of the benefits of the 
new software can be leveraged in improving enterprise efficiencies.23  Minimizing ERP 
customization also facilitates easier future upgrades. 
Software Development, Testing, and Troubleshooting have to be meticulously 
planned to ensure that all business systems interface properly with the ERP software.  
                                                 
20 Fiona Fui-Hoon Nah et al., “Critical factors for successful implementation of enterprise systems,” 
Business Process Management Journal 7, no. 3 (2001): 293. 
21 Suprateek Sarker and Allen S. Lee, “Using a case study to test the role of three key social enablers 
in ERP implementation,” Information and Management 40, no. 8 (September 2003): 825. 
22 Christopher P. Holland and Ben Light, “A critical success factors model for ERP implementation,” 
IEEE Software 16, no. 3 (May 1999): 34. 
23 August-Wilhelm Scheer and Frank Habermann, “Making ERP a success,” Communications of the 
ACM 43, no. 4 (April 2000): 57. 
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Developing and testing interfaces as early as possible ensures that all critical applications 
are captured in the ERP software and that all problems are quickly resolved.24 
Effective Communication is the universal solution to many problems.  ERP 
cannot be planned or implemented in a vacuum.  Everyone in the organization needs to 
be continually updated on ERP implementation efforts.  All stakeholders from users to 
top management have valuable insight into the business process and their inputs need to 
be obtained to ensure ease of implementation and acceptance from all levels of the 
organization.25  Continually communicating goals, expectations, and progress reinforces 
ERP’s top priority in the organization. 
Project Management by the ERP team focuses on supervising resources, business 
processes, software, consultants, and timelines to ensure successful ERP implementation.  
The team manages the ERP roadmap so that benefits and issues are assessed with respect 
to cost and schedule.  The team ensures that successful software implementation is 
deployed on time and that all users are properly trained to exploit the benefits that the 
new ERP software delivers.  Tailoring a new governance model which facilitates the new 
standardized business processes empowers the team to tackle tough decisions.26  The 
team plans and ensures continued ERP support to all stakeholders. 
Monitoring and Evaluation of Performance is an ongoing process throughout the 
ERP implementation process.  Like project management, the team has to ensure that the 
project stays on track.  A constant evaluation of metrics based on business performance, 
cost, and schedule reports will ensure that the project follows the ERP business plan.27  
Reports from users update the team on issues and help the team provide a better end 
product. 
 
                                                 
24 Fiona Fui-Hoon Nah et al., “Critical factors for successful implementation of enterprise systems,” 
Business Process Management Journal 7, no. 3 (2001): 294. 
25 Nah, Critical factors, 291. 
26 Jim Welch and Dmitry Kordysh, “Seven Keys to ERP Success,” Strategic Finance 89, no.3 
(September 2007): 41. 
27 Nah,  Critical factors, 294. 
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Although Project Champion is in the last column and resulted in the fewest 
comments in the research cited, the idea that an ERP project needs an influential leader 
cannot be understated.  A strong leader will guide the business plan and vision by 
providing credibility to the implementation.  He must have the power and authority to 
dismiss resistors and create a cooperative environment for efficient ERP 
implementation.28  A project champion is critical when a resistant manager out ranks the 
team.  The project champion must have power over all departments to ensure that 
resistance to change is minimized and doesn’t result in the failure of the ERP system. 
 
                                                 
28 Suprateek Sarker and Allen S. Lee, “Using a case study to test the role of three key social enablers 
in ERP implementation,” Information and Management 40, no. 8 (September 2003): 821. 
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III. NAVY ERP PROGRAM 
A. THE FOUR PILOT PROGRAMS 
In 1998, the DoN’s Commercial Business Practices Working Group (CBP) 
recommended that the DoN implement an ERP software system to modernize its business 
practices and replace redundant, expensive legacy business systems in order to improve 
financial management accountability and transparency.29  The CBP sought to leverage 
commercial best business practices to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
DoN’s business practices. 
The DoN authorized six ERP pilot programs to test the feasibility of 
implementing ERP COTS software within the DoN.  The six different functional pilot 
programs focused on distinct aspects of management, such as contracting and 
intermediate-level maintenance.  Only four of the original six pilot programs were 
funded: Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Command (SPAWAR), Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP), and Naval Sea 
Systems Command (NAVSEA).  Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet was to focus on 
facilities management and United States Marine Corps on logistics management, but both 
were abandoned due to budget constraints.30  The four approved pilot programs were 
implemented between 1998 and 2003, focusing on separate management functions (Table 
2). 
                                                 
29 U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Business systems modernization: Navy ERP 
adherence to best practices critical to avoid past failures, GAO-05-858 (Washington, DC: Government 
Accountability Office, 2005), 11. 
30 U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-05-858, 11. 
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ERP Pilot Organization Area of pilot's focus Initial Start Cost through FY 2004*
CABRILLO
Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Command
Financial Management
• Navy Working Capital Fund







• Interface to Aviation Depots
August 2000 $346.4 






June 2000 $414.6 
SIGMA Naval Air Systems Command





May 2001 $215.9 
Total $1,044.30
*Dollars in millions.  The costs reflect amounts disbursed through September 30, 2004, as reported by the Navy ERP program.  
Table 2.   Navy ERP Pilot Projects31 
SPAWAR awarded their project CABRILLO contract to PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC) in June 2000.  PwC utilized SAP COTS software to demonstrate financial 
management capabilities in a Navy Working Capital Fund (WCF) at SPAWAR Systems 
Center (SSC) San Diego.32  PwC and SAP in cooperation with other subcontractors 
collaborated on the implementation and integration of the ERP software.  The 
CABRILLO project launched in July 2001 and incorporated the additional functions of 
project, workforce, and asset management. 
NAVSEA awarded their Navy Enterprise Maintenance Automated Information 
System (NEMAIS) project contract to IBM in June 2000.  IBM utilized SAP COTS 
software to demonstrate regional maintenance capabilities at Shore Intermediate 
                                                 
31 U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Business systems modernization: Navy ERP 
adherence to best practices critical to avoid past failures, GAO-05-858 (Washington, DC: Government 
Accountability Office, 2005), 13. 
32 SPAWAR Systems Center, San Diego (SSC San Diego), “Project Cabrillo,” Space and Naval 
Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) (April 2001): 2, 
http://www.spawar.navy.mil/sti/publications/pubs/sd/348/sd348r1.pdf. 
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Maintenance Activity (SIMA) Norfolk.33  IBM and SAP in cooperation with other 
subcontractors collaborated on the implementation and integration of the ERP software.  
The NEMAIS project launched in June 2002 and incorporated the additional functions of 
project, financial, and workforce management. 
NAVSUP partnered with NAVAIR to award their Supply Maintenance Aviation 
Reengineering Team (SMART) project contract to Electronic Data Systems Corporation 
(EDS) in August 2000.  EDS utilized SAP COTS software to demonstrate supply chain 
management capabilities on E-2C and LM-2500 engine maintenance.34  EDS, SAP, and 
Deloitte collaborated on the implementation and integration of the ERP software.  The 
SMART project launched January 2003 and incorporated the additional functions of 
maintenance and financial management. 
NAVAIR awarded their project SIGMA contract to Klynveld Peat Marwick 
Goerdeler (KPMG) in May 2001.  KPMG utilized SAP COTS software to demonstrate 
acquisition program management capabilities in the E-2C Hawkeye program.35  KPMG, 
IBM, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), and a cadre of 
subcontractors collaborated on the implementation and integration of the ERP software.  
The SIGMA project launched in October 2002 and incorporated the additional functions 
of contract, financial, and workforce management. 
The pilot programs were funded and supervised by their respective component 
organizations.  Table 3 catalogs the various subcontractors employed to plan and execute 
the four individual ERP implementations using the SAP compatible software, Bolt-Ons. 
                                                 
33 SPAWAR Systems Center, San Diego (SSC San Diego), “Project Cabrillo,” Space and Naval 
Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) (April 2001): 2 
http://www.spawar.navy.mil/sti/publications/pubs/sd/348/sd348r1.pdf. 
34 SSC San Diego, Project Cabrillo, 2. 
35 SSC San Diego, Project Cabrillo, 2. 
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Table 3.   Function and Integrators36 
Although all four pilots selected the same SAP COTS software, each SYSCOM 
configured the software differently to manage their area of focus.  This resulted in the 
pilots being incapable of integration, and allowed redundant functions across each pilot 
(Table 4).  The core functions of ERP should focus on integrated enterprise applications 
and the DoN was failing.37  Contract cost growth, pilot divergence, and a lack of 
centralized management oversight forced the DoN to reorganize the four pilots to meet 
the requirements of managing their enterprise.38  In 2003, the DoN began development of 
a new navy-wide system, Navy ERP.  Today, Navy ERP is centrally managed by the 
Navy ERP Program Office. 
 
 
                                                 
36 DoN Executive Steering Group (ESG), “ERP 4 program overview,” Department of the Navy 
Research, Development & Acquisition (August 2000): 6, 
https://acquisition.navy.mil/content/download/1422/6924/file/erp.pdf. 
37 U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Business systems modernization: Navy ERP 
adherence to best practices critical to avoid past failures (GAO-05-858) (Washington, DC: Government 
Accountability Office, 2005), 15. 
38 U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-05-858, 14. 
 21
FUNCTION PERFORMED  NEMAIS CABRILLO SIGMA  SMART 
Material Management             
Sales and Distribution  X  X  X  X 
Procurement  X  X  X    
Financial Management             
Financial Accounting  X  X  X  X 
Revenue and Cost Controlling  X  X  X  X 
Asset Accounting  X  X  X  X 
Budgeting and Funds Management  X  X  X    
Program Management             
Project Management  X  X  X    
Planning, Budgeting, & Control  X  X  X    
Workforce Management             
Time and Attendance  X  X  X    
Table 4.   Redundant Functions39 
B. MAJOR POLICIES 
Since the 1980s, Congress has passed a series of congressional initiatives focused 
on improving accounting methods, financial management practices, and performance 
reporting in the U.S. government.  Each new policy provided expansive guidance and 
occasionally established new positions to maximize the utilization of appropriated funds 
and modernize government processes.  The following is an explanation of the policies 
(Table 5) which affect the management of the public sector. 
The Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) of 1982 amended the 
Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 by establishing evaluation guidelines for each 
agency to ensure effective internal accounting and administrative controls.40  The 
controls verify lawful obligations, minimize misappropriations, and properly record 
revenues and expenditures to facilitate reliable financial and statistical reporting.  The 
results of these annual agency control evaluations are reported to the President and 
                                                 
39 U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Business systems modernization: Navy ERP 
adherence to best practices critical to avoid past failures, GAO-05-858 (Washington, DC: Government 
Accountability Office, 2005), 18. 
40 Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act of 1982, Public Law 97-255, 97th Congress (September 8, 
1982). 
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Congress every year.  Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-123, 
















Table 5.   Public Sector Management Focused Legislation 
The CFO Act of 1990 established Deputy Director for Management in OMB and 
an Office of Federal Financial Management headed by a Controller, while designating a 
CFO in each executive department and major agency in the Federal government 
responsible for improving financial management practices.41  The head of each agency 
submitted to the Director of OMB a proposal for reorganizing their agency on the basis of 
improving financial management functions.  The CFO Act supports Congress’ financial 
management reform objectives by providing reliable financial reports so decision makers 
can evaluate Federal programs and reduce wasteful spending.  The twenty four CFOs 
produce annual financial statements prepared according to OMB guidance and certified 
by the agency Inspector General (IG). 
                                                 
41 Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990, Public Law 101-576, 101st Congress (November 15, 
1990). 
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The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 required federal 
agencies to submit a multiyear strategic plan for their programs to OMB and Congress.42  
These annual performance plans establish performance indicators used to compare actual 
program results against established performance goals to improve Federal program 
effectiveness and public accountability. 
The Government Management Reform Act (GMRA) of 1994 reforms the 
management of HR and finances.43  The Act requires the twenty four CFO agencies to 
submit, to OMB and the agency Inspector General, auditable financial statements which 
reflect assets, liabilities, and results of operations.  OMB consolidates the twenty four 
financial statements and the Secretary of the Treasury prepares a Federal financial 
statement which is audited by the US Comptroller General.  The Treasury’s financial 
statement presents the overall financial position of the US government. 
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 requires the DoD 
include an assessment of acquisition program achievement goals in their annual report to 
the President and Congress.44  The DoD shall also collect and maintain standardized 
information on the acquisition workforce which conforms to standards established by 
OMB. 
The Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (FFMIA) of 1996 expands 
the CFO Act, GPRA, and GMRA by incorporating Federal Accounting Standards 
Advisory Board (FASAB) concepts and standards into Federal financial management 
systems.45  This allows Congress to evaluate the cost and performance of Federal 
programs and activities.  FFMIA addresses Congress’ need to eliminate deficiencies in 
Federal accounting standards and strengthen Federal accounting controls. 
 
                                                 
42 Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Public Law 103-62, 103rd Congress (August 3, 
1993). 
43 Government Management Reform Act of 1994, Public Law 103-356, 103rd Congress (October 13, 
1994). 
44 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Public Law 103-355, 103rd Congress (October 13, 
1994). 
45 Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996, Public Law 104-208, 104th Congress 
(September 30, 1996). 
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The Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA) formerly the Information Technology 
Management Reform Act (ITMRA) of 1996 requires the integration of IT planning with 
agency strategic planning, budgeting, and performance assessment to improve the 
productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness of Federal programs.46 CCA also creates the 
new position of CIO in each agency who evaluates the performance of IT programs on 
the basis of performance measurements.  Each agency along with their CIO and CFO 
establish policies to ensure that their IT management systems effectively provide reliable 
and timely program performance data. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 introduced major changes to financial 
management practices and corporate governance for all U.S. public companies and public 
accounting firms.47  Although SOX was enacted in reaction to major corporate and 
accounting scandals, its policies of increased financial transparency and internal control 
assessments have affected both the private and public sectors.  Financial statements must 
fairly present all financial conditions and issues.  Annual reports shall assess the 
effectiveness of internal controls and procedures.  A credible and detailed security policy 
must be established. 
The FY05 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) directed the DoD to 
establish a Defense Business Systems Management Committee (DBSMC) responsible for 
leading defense business system transformation and improvements.48  FY05 NDAA 
requires the DoD develop a business enterprise architecture to cover all defense business 
system functions and activities. 
The Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (FFATA) of 2006 
requires full disclosure of all entities and organizations receiving Federal funds.49  OMB 
 
 
                                                 
46 Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106, 104th Congress 
(February 10, 1996). 
47 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Public Law 107-204, 107th Congress (July 30, 2002). 
48 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Public Law 108-375, 108th Congress 
(October 28, 2004). 
49 Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006, Public Law 109-282, 109th 
Congress (September 26, 2006). 
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established a publicly accessible website, which presents data on each federal financial 
assistance and expenditure.  FFATA was enacted to expand federal agencies' 
accountability and reduce irresponsible spending. 
The FY08 NDAA designates the Deputy Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) as the 
Chief Management Officer (CMO) for the DoD and provides for a Deputy Chief 
Management Officer (DCMO).50  The DCMO supervises the BTA to better synchronize, 
integrate, and coordinate DoD business operations.  FY08 NDAA requires the DoD to 
develop a Strategic Management Plan (SMP), update the plan every two years, and 
submit a report to Congress on each plan.  This SMP details the DoD’s overall strategic 
planning and management framework as well as performance goals and measures. FY08 
NDAA enhances FMFIA requirements. 
The FY10 NDAA requires the military department CMO to determine whether or 
not appropriate BPR efforts have been undertaken before the DoD approves a new 
business system modernization program.51  Previously approved defense business system 
modernizations with a total cost in excess of $100 million must be reviewed by the 
department CMO to determine whether appropriate BPR efforts were conducted.  If not, 
the department CMO must develop a plan to restore the reengineering efforts.  The FY10 
NDAA also requires all twenty four CFO agencies’ financial statements be ready for 
validation on September 30, 2017. 
The DoD initially implemented an uncoordinated approach to comply with the 
numerous legislative requirements of the time.  The DoD eventually turned to BPR to 
coordinate its objectives and centralize the functions of its many independent, specialized 
systems.  However, as Congress increased federal requirements, the DoD recognized the 
need to leverage the business process improvements of the private sector to improve the 
efficiencies of its financial operations. 
 
                                                 
50 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Public Law 110-181, 110th Congress 
(January 28, 2008). 
51 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Public Law 111-84, 111th Congress 
(October 28, 2009). 
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C. HISTORICAL TIMELINE 
In the early 1990s, the “seemingly never ending disclosures of fraud, waste, 
abuse, and mismanagement in federal programs painted a picture of a government unable 
to manage its programs, protect its assets, or provide taxpayers with the effective and 
economical services they expect”.52 U.S. Government realized that effective and efficient 
financial management reform required improved financial oversight of government 
operations, and implemented the CFO Act.  Two key mandates outlined in the CFO Act 
required government agencies to develop and implement integrated accounting and 
financial management systems, and agency asset management systems.53 
Over the next six years, Congress defined and adjusted the efforts of government 
agencies by enacting the GPRA of 1993, the GMRA of 1994, and the FFMIA and CCA 
of 1996.  These statutes, in addition to those listed in Table 5, provide guidance for 
standardizing business systems, financial accountability, and economical system 
investment, as well as creating the positions of the CFO and CIO for each federal 
agency.54  However, a 1996 audit of the twenty four federal agencies found only six of 
the agencies being able to achieve a “clean” audit opinion, with the DoD lagging the 
group.  Furthermore, the same group of agencies were reviewed in 2005 and 75% of the 
agencies received clean audit opinions, with the DoD being largely cited as the main 
cause for the government’s un-auditable financial statements.55 
In 1997, the DoN created the Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA) program to 
transform business processes in the Navy.  The RBA board of directors developed the 
Commercial Financial Practices Working Group (CFP) which lead the DoN’s 
management reform initiatives and commercial financial practices.  The CFP later 
 
 
                                                 
52 U.S. Government Accountability Office, CFO Act of 1990: Driving the transformation of federal 
financial management, GAO-06-242T (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2005), 1. 
53 U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-06-242T, 6. 
54 Office of Management and Budget, “Memoranda 96-20 (Implementation of the information 
technology management reform act of 1996),” The White House, April 4, 1996, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda_m96-20/. 
55 U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-06-242T, 11. 
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became the CBP.  After discussions with industry executives regarding their successes 
with integrating business processes, the CBP decided that the DoN should invest in ERP 
software for management integration.56 
The DoD Enterprise Software Initiative (ESI) was formed in 1998 by the DoD 
CIOs to leverage DoD’s buying power across all commercial enterprise software 
agreements.  In 1999, the first enterprise software agreement (ESA) was awarded for 
DoD’s Joint Technical Architecture.57  DoD ESI negotiates and manages enterprise 
software agreements, assets, and policies for all DoD organizations, as well as the United 
States Coast Guard and the Intelligence community.  Today, DoD ESI manages more 
than 75 ESAs for thousands of software products, including 11 ERP software agreements 
to satisfy DoD acquisition policies outlined in the Federal Acquisition Reform Act 
(FARA).  DoD ESI estimates they have achieved a cost avoidance of over $3 billion by 
negotiating as much as 86% off list prices for software, hardware, and services.58 
Even with the existence of the DoD ESI, the DoN’s four pilot programs were 
allowed to design and execute their own unique ERP programs in order to validate ERP 
implementation for their assigned management functions.  Although the four PM’s for 
the pilots unanimously selected SAP ERP COTS products, each selected different 
contractors to develop and integrate the software.  In December 1998, an Executive 
Steering Group (ESG) was formed to supervise the four pilot projects, and the programs 
began implementation preparations in 1999.59 
SPAWAR awarded their contract to PwC in June 2000 and launched the 
CABRILLO project in July 2001.  NAVSEA awarded their contract to IBM in June 2000 
and launched the NEMAIS project in June 2002.  NAVSUP awarded their contract to 
 
 
                                                 
56 U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Business systems modernization: Navy ERP 
adherence to best practices critical to avoid past failures, GAO-05-858 (Washington, DC: Government 
Accountability Office, 2005), 11. 
57 Chris Panaro, “DoD ESI Celebrates its 10th Anniversary,” CHIPS 26, no.4 (October - December 
2008): 55. 
58 Panaro,  DoD ESI, 54. 
59 U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-05-858, 11. 
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EDS in August 2000 and launched the SMART project in January 2003.  NAVAIR 
awarded a contract to KPMG as the lead contractor in May 2001 and launched the 
SIGMA project in October 2002.60 
Re-engineering business processes is a DoD wide initiative and the DoN took the 
lead on integrating their management systems. Despite the DoD’s efforts to improve its 
accounting and financial management systems, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) has repeatedly scrutinized the DoD’s minimally effective control systems.  In an 
effort to promote business process transformation initiatives, the SECDEF established the 
DoD Financial Management Modernization Program (FMMP) in July 2001 to develop 
business practices and initiatives that would integrate the 1,200+ DoD financial systems 
and their 3,500+ interfaces into a single system capable of providing decision makers 
accurate and timely information.61  Under the joint sponsorship of the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Comptroller) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information 
Integration), FMMP was renamed the Business Management Modernization Program 
(BMMP) in May 2003. 
After the DoN deployed and evaluated its ERP pilot projects, it was apparent that 
the pilot programs possessed a fatal flaw; their designs were not compatible with one 
another.  In September 2002, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 
Development, and Acquisition established the Navy ERP Convergence Team to develop 
an ERP acquisition plan to combine the four pilot programs into one integrated business 
and management system.62  In 2003, the Navy ERP Program Office was established to 
develop and implement a standard Navy-wide ERP architecture utilizing lessons learned 
from the Navy pilot programs and specific guidance from applicable DoD directives.  A 
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final DoD evaluation concluded that the Navy ERP pilot programs were successfully 
executed using COTS software, thus moving the Navy ERP Program into the acquisition 
process.   
In September 2004, Navy ERP became an Acquisition Category (ACAT) I 
program focused on integrating finance, supply chain, program management, and 
workforce management data into a single business system to support the modern Navy 
enterprise.63  As Navy ERP evolved through the acquisition process, the pilot programs 
were retired to prepare for the new Navy wide ERP program.  The SAP COTS software 
was retained as the preferred system based on the familiarity with the SAP software and 
its success in the pilot programs. 
The 2005 NDAA reiterated the DoD’s focus on business process improvements 
mandating the development of a DoD Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA), a DoD 
Enterprise Transition Plan (ETP), and a DBSMC.  The DBSMC was established in 
February 2005 with the Deputy SECDEF as the senior member.  The BEA is the DoD’s 
guide to business transformation and the ETP is a management tool used by the various 
DoD organizations in implementing business transition plans, schedules, and budgets.64  
The DBSMC approves all business system improvements to ensure compliance with 
BEA and ETP priorities. 
On October 7, 2005, the Deputy SECDEF replaced the BMMP with the Defense 
BTA to guide enterprise business capabilities focused on supporting the sailors and 
soldiers.65  Recognized as the central authority for DoD’s business transformation and 
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establishes system standards, minimizes redundancy, and shifts resources as required in 
implementing a comprehensive enterprise-wide system for the DoD.  The BTA ultimately 
seeks to provide financial accountability across the DoD.66   
The annual BEA published by the BTA acts as the guide for defense business 
system managers.  The BEA drives the ETP which is the DoD’s plan for a combined 
defense enterprise architecture.  The Defense Financial Improvement and Audit 
Readiness Plan (FIAR) in conjunction with the ETP ensure the DoD includes financial 
management and accounting performance improvements in the defense enterprise 
architecture. 
In September 2005, the GAO conducted an independent review of the Navy’s 
ERP initiatives and concluded that the Navy wasted over $1 billion on its pilot programs.  
The DoN refuted the GAO findings and identified key lessons learned which would 
directly impact the success of future ERP implementations.67  First, system users’ 
feedback is fundamental to the detailed requirements development process which ensures 
the system effectively and efficiently accomplishes all tasks of the organization from the 
bottom up.  Inputs from workers across the entire organizational hierarchy help define 
needed system capabilities which are included in the program’s operational requirements 
document.  Second, the Navy ERP Program Officer must limit the customization of the 
SAP COTS software to only regulatory specific modifications.  The DoN must modify 
their business practices to accommodate the SAP software.  This provides for lower 
modification costs and allows the COTS software to produce the efficiencies established 
with the original design specifications. 
In addition to writing off the Navy ERP Program as a $1 billion loss, GAO 
commented on the shortfalls of the DoN pilot projects and identified issues to address to 
ensure interoperability of the Navy ERP program in the future.  Though many of the 
critical issues regarding the pilot projects (e.g. the pilots’ inability to work as an 
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integrated system) were already being addressed by the Navy ERP Program Office, the 
GAO specifically cited four challenges for the DoN to overcome in order for the 
enterprise-wide system to achieve at least minimal success: (1) systematically address the 
problem of integrating the large number of data interfaces between ERP and existing 
legacy systems, (2) ensure proper data conversion from legacy to ERP systems, (3) 
establish key performance parameters to guide overall ERP system development and 
implementation, and (4) develop metrics for evaluating cost, schedule and performance 
factors of the Navy ERP program.68 
In order to ensure seamless and accurate information exchange from one 
management system to the next, the DoN must mitigate the inherent risks in integrating 
the ERP IT system with the large number of legacy systems (4,150 in DoD) by 
systematically addressing the issues existing at each interface.69  For example, the 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service and the U.S. Transportation Command increase 
the difficulty of supplying real-time asset visibility since their systems already have 
intrinsic lag in their data transfer and reporting modules without the Navy ERP 
integration occurring.  As the Navy ERP Program is expanded in the future to include 
Naval Installations Command, aviation and ship depots, and vessels at sea, sustainment 
and future integration could result in increased cost as their legacy systems age and these 
commands adapt to operating independently.  Also, DoD’s Global Information Grid 
(GIG) will undoubtedly present future hurdles to the Navy ERP Program as DoD 
attempts to integrate all of DoD’s information systems, services, applications, and data 
into one secure network.70  Continued integration testing is paramount to ensuring 
reliable data transfer between DoD’s current legacy systems and the future DoD 
enterprise architecture. 
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The Navy ERP Program Office must ensure accurate and timely conversion of 
data as it is transferred from legacy systems to the ERP system.71  If this process is 
undervalued and improperly executed, it could negatively impact cost, performance, and 
schedule efficiencies.  Time and money would be wasted in both the initial conversion 
and the rework for the required corrections and testing to guarantee accurate reporting.  
This task is critical to the overall success of the program and to the level of financial 
reporting that DoD is planning to achieve. 
The DoD’s BEA plan has not identified what key performance parameters will be 
used to lay the foundation for the DoD’s enterprise architecture.72  Without this starting 
point, the Navy ERP Program Office is potentially designing and implementing a large 
scale system that may not be compatible with DoD’s developmental enterprise 
architecture.  Different business processes and technology standards could result in costly 
rework for the DoN and the DoD.  Periodic assessment of the Navy ERP system by DoD 
and BTA will be critical to the success of DoD’s enterprise architecture. 
The DoN lacks the metrics required to assess the performance of their efforts.73  
The Navy ERP Program Office is adhering to the required acquisition guidelines and 
directives, but the GAO still suggests additional performance, cost, and schedule metrics 
to identify and reduce risks by providing a quantitative measure of progress.  GAO also 
believes that the Navy ERP Program Office should follow the industry practice of 
employing an independent third party to assess the progress of the ERP program instead 
of using DoD and Navy ERP Program in-house subject matter experts.  An independent 
assessment should provide an unbiased opinion of the system’s true status. 
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Through 2008, the GAO continued to address the DoD’s non-compliance with the 
BEA requirement of establishing a viable enterprise architecture structure.74  The DoD 
needs to define its technical and business process standards which would allow for the 
determination of system integration efficiencies and identification of potential issues as 
the BTA moves forward with the enterprise development process.  In order to promote 
further compliance across the entire enterprise, the DoD and BTA need to issue guidance 
with respect to technical specifications to minimize the duplication of efforts resulting in 
the waste of funds.75 
As the DoN continues to develop its ERP acquisition strategy, the DoD is 
concurrently implementing enterprise architectures, and conducting committee and 
agency reviews ensuring all defense agencies are aligned with the DoD’s SMP.  The 
SMP ensures operations and business initiatives are aligned to support specific 
performance objectives.76  The GAO is still concerned with the cost of aligning the 
DoN’s current ERP program with DoD’s enterprise architecture since both are being 
planned and implemented in parallel.77  The GAO eventually acknowledged the DoN’s 
improved test management structure and system defect supervision.  However, the GAO 
continued to scrutinize the Navy ERP program’s lack of an independent audit of their 
program.  The ERP Program Office continues to multi-task their contractors as system 
release managers and standards appraisers.78 
The Navy ERP Program is currently managed by PEO-EIS as an ACAT I 
Information and Communication program.  Navy ERP is being deployed across the 
enterprise in phases using SAP software (Figure 3).  Release 1.0 was first deployed at 
NAVAIR in October 2007 to modify financial and acquisition systems.  Release 1.1 was 
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deployed at NAVSUP in March 2010 to merge wholesale and retail supply functions.  
Release 1.2 was scheduled for deployment in the fall of 2010 to integrate maintenance 
applications, but is no longer part of the Program of Record.79  Future Templates and 
their corresponding releases will be deployed to integrate evolving management 
capabilities (e.g., property and contract management). 
 
Figure 3.   Navy ERP Program Schedule80 
The difficult but successful deployment of Release 1.0 at NAVAIR set the 
foundation for the entire Navy ERP system which is one of the world’s largest public 
sector implementations.81  Release 1.0 will perform broad acquisition and financial 
functions starting with Echelon II and III commands to include General Fund (GF) & 
Navy WCF financial management, procurement, workforce management, and 
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program/project management.  Release 1.0 was awarded to BearingPoint, Inc as the 
prime integrator of the SAP software.  As of June 1, 2010, BearingPoint is converting and 
resolving issues with legacy Navy WCF data as it begins transitioning the data into the 
Navy ERP system.82  NAVAIR, NAVSUP, and SPAWAR are running Release 1.0 with 
NAVSEA GF scheduled to execute their transition early in fiscal year (FY) 2011. 
Release 1.1 tackles the function of wholesale and retail supply by integrating the 
supply chain management functions of planning, allowancing, procurement, repair of 
repairables, and order fulfillment into the Navy’s enterprise system.  Release 1.1 is 
designed to be the Navy’s single supply solution built on Release 1.0’s foundation to 
ensure compatibility.83  It retires a myriad of legacy supply systems which stove-piped 
inventory and transaction visibility.  Release 1.1 offers decision makers improved 
planning and forecasting which reduces sourcing requirements and reduces excessive 
safety inventory.  Improving forecasts and reducing inventories are essential to 
addressing the DoD’s highly publicized lack of financial management controls and 
auditable financial statements.84  Release 1.1 was awarded to IBM as the prime 
integrator.  As of June 1, 2010, IBM is focused on weapon systems data integration at 
Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP).85  Fleet & Industrial Supply Centers (FISC) 
are schedule to begin converting their legacy supply systems to the Navy’s enterprise 
system in FY 2011.  Figure 4 highlights the progression of Navy ERP. 
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Figure 4.   Navy ERP Timeline86 
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IV. PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE SECTOR IT MANAGEMENT 
CHALLENGES 
A. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS  
The implementation of an ERP system is a significant undertaking for any 
organization.  Properly recognizing and addressing the challenges in deploying ERP IT 
systems in public sector organizations requires an understanding of: (1) the differences 
between public sector and private sector organizations, and (2) how those differences 
affect an organization’s IT decision making and policy formulation.  Compared to the 
private sector, the public sector faces even greater challenges because a majority of the 
empirical research and best practices stem from private sector IT implementation 
research.  A review of the literature by Y.B. Moon suggests significant research in ERP 
over the last decade, but with a still maturing emphasis on ERP in public sector 
organizations.87 
Barry Bozeman and Stuart Bretschneider propose differences between the public 
and private sectors, and that those differences should be accounted for in the management 
of IT systems within each sector.  The research, theories, and best practices of the time 
dealt primarily with private sector organizations, and thus we note the applicability and 
implementation of private sector-based solutions in addressing public sector IT issues.88  
However, the key is determining which solutions are applicable for public sector IT 
issues. 
The framework for researching and solving private sector IT management issues 
may not be applicable to public sector IT management issues.  For instance, the private 
sector framework does not account for the effects of an organization's external 
environment.  The deficiency makes the private sector framework suspect in its 
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applicability to public sector organizations, which are strongly influenced by external 
environmental factors.89  The interrelationships between internal organizational entities 
and external actors who possess decision making and policy formulation rights must be 
addressed when examining public sector entities. 
To address the sector differences, Bozeman and Bretschneider developed a 
framework for differentiating between private and public sector organizations in order to 
identify sector specific issues of IT management and implementation.  A hybrid model 
was formed using existing literature and four models of publicness:  Economic Authority, 
Political Authority, Personnel and Personnel Systems, and Work Context model.  A 
broad application of the framework across several entities in each sector reveals traits that 
could distinguish public from private organizations (Table 6).90  The distinguishing 
variables thus provide a baseline for conducting analysis of public sector-specific IT 
issues in future research. 
Since the development of the Bozeman and Bretschneider framework, empirical 
research on private sector IT systems has grown at a vigorous pace, but work in the field 
of public sector IT management and implementation has lagged.  However, several 
studies have identified common differences between the public and private sector, and 
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Publicness Model Distinguishing Variables 
Economic Authority Model 1. Market Failure 
a. Poor Information 
b. Breakdowns in Competition 
c. Transaction Costs 
d. Externalities and Public Goods 
2. Property Rights 
a. Input of Entrepreneurs and Wealth Sharing Managers 
b. Inability to Transfer Ownership in the Public Sector 
Political Authority Model 1. Legal and Constitutional Structure 
a. Fragmentation and Interdependency 
b. Representatives and Electoral Process 
c. Individual Rights 
2. Social Psychological Sources of Authority 
a. Public Expectations, Public Interest 
b. Civic Responsibility of the Individual 
Work Context Model 1. Time Frame 
2. Political Cycles 
3. Media Attention 
4. Crisis Attention 
5. Accountability and Monitoring 
Personnel Model 1. Personnel Systems and Incentives 
2. Motivation, Job Satisfaction 
3. Red Tape and Formalism 
4. Self-Selection 
Table 6.   Four Models of Publicness: A Summary of Propositions91 
B. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR IT 
PRACTICES 
Bruce Rocheleau’s critical review of the empirical research to date on private and 
public sector IT systems serves to consolidate the existing points of view within the 
research field, and evaluate the Bozeman and Bretschneider management information 
systems framework.92  An analysis of the various sector identifying characteristics 
suggests many similarities do exist between public and private sector (Figure 5), hence 
the logical adoption of ERP IT systems by public sector entities. 93 
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Figure 5.   Examples of Common Activities in Organizations94 
Yet there are key differences that directly affect public sector management of IT 
systems, and therefore should be addressed in strategic planning and implementation of 
governmental IT systems.  The proposed differences are as follows: 
 Public sector has greater concern with accountability, openness, and 
representativeness than the private sector 95 
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 Public sector IT systems have greater focus on vertical and external 
linkages than the private sector 96 
 Greater legal constraints and political influences for public sector 
organizations 97 
 Higher risk aversion due to greater scrutiny of public sector business 
practices 98 
 Greater complexity in objectives and goals of public sector organizations 
99 
 Fewer, if any, incentives for high level of performance in public sector 
organizations 100 
 Differences in worker job satisfaction, motivation, and commitment 
between the sectors 101 
 Different approaches to decision making within each sector 102 
Ongoing research acknowledges that the private and public sector differences 
above are still open for debate.  Some of the concerns are: (1) both private and public 
organizations exhibit some degree of publicness; (2) each of the differences is not 
entirely public in nature; (3) the growing trend of public and private sector entities 
exhibiting common characteristics and goals; and (4) the ambiguity in how the term 
public is defined and applied.103  Also, public sector objectives vary depending on the 
level of government and management being observed, thus differences between public 
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and private organizations must be stated contingently based on these two variables.104  
However, our review of the existing body of knowledge suggests enough empirical 
evidence exists to support using the differences listed above in examining 
implementation issues of the DoN IT enterprise system. 
C. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DON 
Even among other public sector organizations, the DoN possesses unique 
characteristics to consider in developing an IT governance framework.  Drawing from the 
presented theories, we establish a framework for examining the unique public sector 
characteristics of the DoN.  The framework takes a policy level view, focusing on areas 
affecting executive level decision-making.  The following areas represent the core of our 
framework for examining the unique characteristics of the DoN:  (1) Strategic 
Vision/Goals; (2) Culture; (3) Structure; and (4) Political Influence (Table 7).   
DoN Focus Areas DoN Characteristics/Traits
(1) Goal Clarity
(2) Business vs. Non-Business Goals
Strategic Vision/Goals (3) Enterprise vs. Unit
(4) Modernization vs. Transformation
(5) Leadership
(1) Rank vs. Position/Billet
(2) Vertical Orientation/Stovepipe
Structure (3) Roles and Accountability
(4) Decision Making
(1) Warfare Communities
(2) Motivation, Job Satisfaction
Culture (3) Organizational vs. Unit
(4) Accepted Behaviors
(5) Established Standards/Work Practices
(1) Internal & External Policy Regulation
(2) Political Cycles/Processes
Politcal Influence (3) Formal Programs
(4)Transparency
 
Table 7.   DoN Public Sector Characteristics Framework 
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The DoN is a non-profit organization with a non-business focused strategic 
vision, “The mission of the Navy is to maintain, train and equip combat-ready Naval 
forces capable of winning wars, deterring aggression and maintaining freedom of the 
seas.”105  This leads us to an analysis of several aspects: (1) who owns the enterprise IT 
system and provides the leadership to promote the program; (2) does the Navy ERP 
Program have an appropriate strategic vision; and (3) the potential difficulty in defining 
enterprise-wide IT business transformation goals and objectives in the non-business 
environment of the DoN. 
Culture can be observed in the language, customs, problem solving methods, and 
uses of technology that are established by a group of people through social interaction in 
order to deal with the challenges presented by the surrounding environment.106  The DoD 
is a culture comprised of the unique sub-cultures of the various service branches and 
defense agencies, and is further subdivided into sub-cultures in the service branches.  
Within our framework we examine the affects of the DoN sub-cultures (e.g. warfare 
communities, subspecialties, commands and organizations) on the implementation of an 
enterprise IT governance structure.  The cultural tendencies identify two key components 
affecting IT governance: (1) values that identify preferences for specific behaviors and 
outcomes, and (2) norms that dictate acceptable behaviors.107 
The structural concepts we focus on are: (1) the vertical orientation of the 
department (i.e., chain of command and existing stovepipes); (2) rank vs. positional 
authority; and (3) decision-making rights and authority.  Each concept is not unique to 
the DoN.  However, their cumulative effect along with the size and complexity of the 
DoN potentially influence any type of governance within the department and warrant 
further investigation. 
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The DoD and DoN are influenced by a myriad of policy, regulation, and statute.  
Key legislation (Table 5) in concert with congressional authorization and appropriation 
acts establishes requirements to meet the financial reporting needs of government 
oversight and regulatory bodies (i.e., OMB, DoD IG, GAO, and Congress).  This 
potentially results in competition with the priorities and goals in DoN directives.  
Furthermore, the DoN participates in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 
Execution (PPBE) process and as a result is subject to a level of scrutiny and 
transparency unlike any in the private sector.   
Each area will be reviewed individually and collectively in order to understand 
the possible effects on establishing an appropriate governance structure.  Though 
represented by individually listed characteristics, the characteristics are not mutually 
exclusive.  Therefore we posit that a characteristic may surface within other areas, and 
that the more times a characteristic is acknowledged across the different areas the greater 




V. GOVERNANCE THEORY 
A. DEFINITION OF IT GOVERNANCE 
The many views of governance obscure an already vaguely defined concept.  
Thus, when applied to the rapidly changing field of technology, the meaning of IT 
governance is only further complicated by the interpretations of researchers in the IT 
field of study.  The basic concepts underlying the theory behind IT governance, and an 
acceptable definition must be presented as a starting point for any constructive discussion 
of a system's control environment. 
In Merriam Webster's Dictionary, governance is simply defined as government108, 
with government itself relating to the exercise of authority over and by political units 
throughout an organization, or agency, in an effort to provide authoritative direction or 
control.109  However, governance is not simply the exercise of authority and the outcome 
of the rules of law of a government system.  Governance goes further in identifying the 
interrelationships that exist among the various actors, and how these interactions create 
an internally regulated governing framework.110  The governing processes of an 
organization are directly influenced by the perceptions, motivations, and beliefs of those 
who internally control the system.   
Bjoern Niehaves et al. stated, "An IT consulting project can thus be perceived as 
an institutional arena for political activities where particular actors, who include 
management, employees and consultants, negotiate and promote their own interests."111  
Implementing an enterprise-wide IT system undoubtedly results in changes to the 
technological framework of an organization.  However, the accompanying sociopolitical 
changes that must occur for a successful implementation are often overlooked.  Little 
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focus is placed on understanding the effect of politics on large scale IT projects.  The 
varying reasons behind the actions of all the people with a role in the implementation 
must be considered.112 
Attempts to regulate a strategic IT system by people external to an organization 
can fail for a number of reasons: (1) operational problems due to inadequate assessment 
of implementation capabilities; (2) a disregard for the norms, values and motivations of 
internal implementers; (3) external regulators lack of internal system knowledge; and (4) 
internal regulatory actions countering external regulators.113  Therefore, IT governance 
processes should account for internal and external regulation by actors in and out of an 
organization, and their underlying motivations.  This perspective challenges the idea that 
regulators of a system can be viewed as external to the system, and suggests a re-framing 
of the system to include all personnel who can influence the system.114 
IT governance is not about the day-to-day decisions associated with mid-level 
management.  IT governance revolves around higher level influences on the existing 
organizational culture, policy establishment, and strategic direction.115  An IT 
governance framework should not exist independently from the organization's existing 
governance structure, but should be incorporated into the existing control framework.  
Furthermore, for any implementation effort, two facets of IT governance should be 
specifically addressed: (1) the assigning of decision-making authority and accountability 
to specific groups/individuals, and (2) the establishment of applicable rules and control 
structure for the project.116  The value in understanding the governance perspective of an 
organization leads to greater understanding in how governance processes change within 
an organization. 
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Taking these factors into consideration, we adopted the Weill and Ross definition 
of IT governance as, “Specifying the framework for decision rights and accountabilities 
to encourage desirable behavior in the use of IT”.117  In this interpretation, desirable 
behaviors are those that support the culture, norms, and overarching strategy of the 
organization, and as such must examine the values of those people affected.  
Additionally, the concept of creating a framework for who makes the different types of 
decisions, who provides inputs for each decision point, and how these people are held 
accountable brings together the idea of re-framing the view of an organization to include 
all people involved.118 
B. WEILL AND ROSS IT GOVERNANCE MODEL 
Some level of IT governance exists across all organizations and industries.  The 
plethora of viable solutions that could be implemented begs the question of what is the 
ideal solution.  In truth, the acceptable answer is that it depends on the organization, its 
goals, culture, size, etc., and therefore requires a deliberate, systematic approach to 
determine the best governance framework. 
Peter Weill and Jeanne Ross provide a tool for analyzing and developing an 
organization’s IT governance framework.  Their IT governance study included 256 
multiple business unit enterprises (encompassing both for-profit and non-profit entities) 
in 23 countries spanning across the Americas, Europe, and Asia Pacific.119  The initial 
results revealed that successful enterprise initiatives actively pursued the business 
benefits of IT in the following ways:120 
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 Clearly define the business strategy. 
 Specifically outline IT’s role in achieving the business strategy. 
 Measure and manage the amount spent and value received from IT. 
 Establish organizational practices to blend IT into the business strategy. 
 Determine the organizational changes required to achieve the benefits 
from the new IT capabilities. 
 Determine accountability for implementing organizational changes. 
The Weill and Ross methodology emphasizes two main areas: major decision-
making domains and typical IT decision-making approaches.  The major decision-making 
domains (Figure 6) can be viewed at any level throughout an organization (i.e., C-level  
 
Figure 6.   Five Major IT Decisions121 
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executive, business unit, or functional).  Therefore, to hold managers accountable for the 
results, the preliminary discussion should identify how the organization corresponds with 
the context of the domains and then establish who will make the decisions and be held 
accountable for the different decision-making domains.122 
Once decision making or input rights for a domain are determined, Weill and 
Ross use political archetypes to describe the variety of decision making combinations that 
can be deployed, Figure 7.123  Depending on the cultural norms, existing governance 
structures, business goals, etc., an organization will need to determine the best 
approaches to implement within its IT governance structure.  A number of approaches 
may be used as dictated by the needs and goals of the organization. 
 
Figure 7.   IT Governance Archetypes124 
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The result is a one page matrix cross referencing the decision-making domains, 
input/output rights, and decision-making approaches, Figure 8.  With this tool, the 
organization can analyze and communicate where IT decisions are made, and determine 
the location and type of governance mechanisms required to support the enterprise 
objectives.125  Utilizing this model, we will examine the existing Navy ERP Program 
governance structure and attempt to identify areas for potential improvement. 
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VI. ANALYSIS 
Analyzing the public sector characteristics of the DoN with our framework 
provided the basis for our SME interviews.  Our research data was corroborated by the 
interview responses and trends within the governance of the program emerged during the 
course of our interviews.  The results are presented in the next three sections.  The first 
section utilizes our analysis framework (Table 7) to examine the public sector 
characteristics of the DoN that could impact the governance of the Navy ERP Program.  
The second section uses the Weill and Ross model for governance to analyze the specific 
characteristics of the Navy ERP governance structure as it exists today. The third section 
discusses best practices within the program.  
A. DON PUBLIC SECTOR CHARACTERISTIC FRAMEWORK 
1. Strategic Vision/Goals 
The DoD lacks a comprehensive strategic plan for its business transformation 
efforts.127  The efforts have focused on modernizing business systems vice BPR required 
for transformation of the department’s business practices.128  However, the DoD has 
made some progress in establishing a business enterprise architecture and the associated 
corporate policies, rules and standards, while the DoN has not fully committed itself to 
developing an adequate business enterprise architecture or transition plan and is thus 
minimally effective in guiding its enterprise-wide decisions. 129  Our respondents agreed 
that a strategic business vision does not exist with regards to Navy ERP, and that 
establishing an effective governance structure is mutually dependent on developing a 
strategic focus emphasizing an enterprise level perspective of BPR. 
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Goal clarity is the linchpin of strategic planning which aligns an organization’s 
efforts in pursuing prioritized objectives.  In that context, strategic planning for 
enterprise-wide IT systems must be incorporated into the development of the 
organization’s goals, rather than IT systems being regulated to fulfill requirements or 
objectives which precluded the IT enterprise.130  The lack of an enterprise perspective 
resulted in the four Navy pilot programs designing and executing their own unique ERP 
program in order to validate ERP implementation for their assigned management 
functions.  Ultimately, the pilot programs were not compatible with one another which 
defeated the logic behind instituting a single, enterprise-wide system to provide real-time 
information for all units within the organization. 
A trait of successful IT investment decision making is sustained executive 
leadership which can overcome cultural resistance, ensure adequate resources, and garner 
top management support and understanding.131  DoN does not have a single owner of the 
business enterprise requirements.  As a result, the DoN is unable to develop an end-to-
end enterprise level view of its business processes in order to standardize the business of 
the DoN.  As a military organization without a common business vision, standard 
business processes, or an owner for enterprise requirements, the DoN IT governance 
structure is relegated to making business decisions by committee.  Furthermore, our SME 
responses added that the number of groups that must be represented in these governing 
bodies leads to a slow, ineffective decision-making mechanism in which you agree to 
disagree and move forward by consensus.  Another key point made by several SME was 
that the governing bodies, with respect to Navy ERP, are primarily advisory and carry no 
authority to force compliance throughout the various domains. 
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2. Structure 
Not unlike companies in the private sector, the DoN is a stove-piped organization.  
The stovepipes of the DoN are inherently aligned with the military chain of command, 
and as a result will always exist to some extent.  Stovepipes inhibit effective horizontal 
interaction and prevent the development of a horizontally oriented, end-to-end enterprise 
perspective. In the case of an enterprise IT business system, mitigating the enterprise 
aspect results in another stand-alone IT database. 
The chain of command also presents a unique dichotomy to consider in assigning 
appropriate and sufficient decision-making authority and responsibilities within a 
governance structure.  The DoN outlines roles and responsibilities based on rank and or 
positional authority.  The complexity of the DoN structure can result in the two factors 
opposing one another where an individual with positional authority requires compliance 
from an equal or senior ranking member.  An example provided by one SME was the 
inability of the Principal Deputy-Assistant Secretary of the Navy of Research, 
Development, and Acquisition, a rear admiral at the time, to force compliance from a 
SYSCOM commander, a vice-admiral, because of inadequate authority vested in the 
position and provided by rank.  Our SME agree that appropriate forcing functions to hold 
people accountable are required to establish an effective governance structure.  
The DoN is a decentralized decision-making organization which provides a 
significant amount of autonomy for its commanding officers in the field.  The amount of 
latitude for our commanders provides the most efficient and effective decision-making 
format from a military perspective, but can be detrimental when attempting to conduct 
BPR efforts which are normally seen as back office functions.  Local controls within 
DoN organizations inhibit efforts to standardize business processes horizontally across 
the enterprise.  The multi-faceted complexity of the DoN chain of command gives rise to 
numerous governance structures existing across the enterprise, all the way down to the 
unit level, which results in significant overlap when attempting to integrate IT 
capabilities across the enterprise. 
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Furthermore, several SME alluded to the fact that the Navy ERP governance 
structure cannot be separated from the inherent structure of the DoN.  Therefore, in 
designing an IT governance structure within the existing structure of the DoN, any 
structural and cultural challenges should be specifically addressed when determining 
decision-making rights within the program.  A majority of our SME indicated an 
enterprise business office in conjunction with sustained high-level leadership could be a 
solution to this concern.  While executive leadership establishes the vision and maintains 
the authority to hold people accountable, the enterprise business office would be the 
actual body that executes the vision across the entire enterprise.  The enterprise business 
office would focus on the end-to-end business process requirements ensuring cross-
functionality throughout the enterprise, as the executive level leadership ensured 
compliance from the stakeholders.   
3. Culture 
The stove-pipes in the DoN are not only aligned through domains, but warfare 
communities, subspecialties, and individual commands.  In the private sector, a company 
must understand its cultures, norms, and values in order to initiate a successful change 
management plan.  In comparison, the DoN must consider the culture of the Navy as a 
whole along with its numerous sub-cultures.  As one person indicated, “we wanted the 
benefits of an integrated system, but we implemented a disintegrated system”132 which 
optimizes within each domain thereby sub-optimizing the overall enterprise.   The ERP 
technology is capable of integrating many processes (e.g., finance, logistics, and 
acquisition) into a shared database, thus “the big question is if the Navy is ready for an 
enterprise system and all that it means?”133 
From aviation to surface to sub-surface, each community has deeply rooted norms 
and values established by history and tradition.  As a result, different standards of 
behavior and work practices are evident across all levels of the DoN, further polarizing 
efforts to establish standard business processes across the enterprise.  As one interviewee 
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pointed out, “…the people responsible for maritime maintenance are going to want all the 
determinations and control over what they do and the people for aviation are going to do 
the same thing.  To get them to sit side-by-side and try to create a set of processes that 
both will live by, they may shake their head up and down, but inside they are saying there 
is no way we can do it the same way.”134 
Competition for limited resources within the DoN requires commands to focus on 
how they can maximize resources within their cognizance.  This produces internally 
established business and work practices that maximizes a command’s level of efficiency.  
However, these practices may not return the same benefits at an enterprise level.  
Furthermore, many of these unit-level norms are deeply ingrained within the standard 
operating procedures and present barriers to implementing an enterprise-wide IT 
management system.  As several SME pointed out, commands would continuously 
attempt to adapt Navy ERP to their internally established practices seeking to reap the 
same internal efficiencies, and when unable to do so cite issues with the ERP Program.  
The idea of creating efficiency for the entire enterprise was a concept not aligned with the 
norms and values of many entities across the DoN enterprise.  
The year-end spending within the DoN presents a phenomenon not seen in the 
private sector.  For example, Congressional appropriations funding Operations and 
Maintenance and Military Personnel accounts have a one year expiration date.  Once 
expired, the funds can no longer be used on new obligations.  The funds will sit in an 
expired state for five years where they can be used against previously unrecorded 
obligations or as adjustments to already recorded obligations.  Any leftover funds are 
cancelled and returned to the Treasury.   
As a result, there is no incentive to be efficient with your spending.  If you do not 
spend your allotted budget, it is given to another command before it expires or returned to 
the Treasury after cancellation.  Thus, a successful command will execute every dollar 
received, and has a greater propensity to minimize data sharing; focus on efficiencies 
primarily at the command level; and minimize the transparency of their business 
operations. 
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4. Political Influence 
With approximately $708 billion requested for the DoD in the President’s 
FY2011 budget135 the citizenry, legislature, and watchdog organizations (government 
and non-government) demand greater oversight, and a movement to improve on the poor 
financial management controls and lack of transparency of business practices within the 
DoD and the DoN.  Accountability to external entities, accessibility of information, and 
representativeness of the citizenry are of more concern in the public sector.  Public sector 
organizations have a greater requirement for responding to citizens, higher level 
government authorities, and other peer organizations.136  Public sector IT systems are 
designed to allow for a level of transparency which permits citizens and elected officials 
to openly critique and observe government practices.137  Furthermore, public sector 
organizations are purported to be based on the premise of knowledge sharing, whereas 
knowledge sharing in the private sector is precluded by the competitive nature within the 
capital markets and is of minimal importance.138  
Dealing with DoD and federal agencies, a complicated budgeting process, and 
continuous Congressional oversight results in many policies being codified into legal 
requirements.  The DoN is not a business, but political bodies exert considerable 
influence in mandating business requirements that impact how the DoN conducts 
operations.  A large number of policies and independent groups must therefore be 
appeased to meet the statutory requirements of the program, “In essence, independent 
fiefdoms that all have to say yes.”139  Thus, the DoN has to support multiple strategies in 
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addition to its own.  Though private companies are also subject to federal, state, and local 
laws and can be influenced by political bodies (i.e., the Congress and its various 
committees), the DoN receives its funding from these same bodies and is subject to a 
higher level scrutiny of its business practices.  The DoN can be directed by Congress’ 
power of the purse, but the same cannot be said for a private company.  
Since 1996, the financial management and accounting practices of the DoD and 
other government agencies have been the subject of increasing public scrutiny.   
Specifically, the DoD’s ongoing inability to produce auditable financial statements is a 
common theme in the GAO reports we reviewed.  DoD business process transformation 
initiatives are regarded as “high-risk” by the GAO, and congressional oversight has 
increased considerably with the passing of at least nine significant financial management 
reform acts over the last twenty years (Table 5).  In addition, a number of DoD and DoN 
policies (e.g., DoD ESI, DoD BMMP, and DoD BEA and ETP) arose through the years 
to complement the congressional financial reform acts.  Combined with the speed at 
which mistakes are brought to the forefront of the public eye, the cumulative effect for 
public organizations is higher risk aversion and smaller probability of investing in costly 
new technologies.140 
Another facet unique to the DoN, is the acquisition program.  The private sector 
doesn’t have an acquisition program like the DoD, and can therefore focus on the 
business enterprise throughout the decision-making process.  The governance of the Navy 
ERP Program is derived from acquisition governance which does not have a business 
focus and doesn’t consider BPR within the context of the milestone decision making.  
Many leaders do not have background in establishing enterprise-wide IT strategies and 
BPR efforts.  Therefore, deferring to an acquisition based governance model makes sense 
because “there is an embedded acquisition governance process that is well understood 
and executed throughout the Navy”.141  It was noted that the acquisition program 
provided value by ensuring the program would reach full operability and be compliant 
with applicable statute and regulation.  However, the successful roll-out of technology is 
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only one aspect in developing an enterprise business solution.  In order to obtain the real 
benefits of an enterprise IT system, the Navy ERP must transition to an enterprise 
business perspective of governance to leverage the capabilities of the program across the 
DoN.    
The level of scrutiny required of an ACAT 1AM acquisition program actually 
benefitted the development and deployment of the Navy ERP convergence because of the 
strong program management required to meet acquisition milestones. However, it is this 
same level of transparency which makes it hard to accept a standard enterprise-wide IT 
solution.  Navy ERP can provide a higher level of transparency with a full audit trail, but 
the major domain owners do not want that to happen, “We come from a culture where we 
won’t even tell the guy next to us-we don’t even tell our bosses what we did….”142  For 
example, DoN existing business practices promotes maximizing financial resources at a 
unit vice enterprise level.  The sharing of information horizontally among peers and 
vertically with senior leadership (internal and external to the DoN) opens the door for 
questions concerning every commander’s business practices and challenges their 
authority, “If you think people are going to let loose of their pet rock for the good of the 
Navy you are dreaming.  It isn’t going to happen.  We had to literally pry rocks out of 
people’s hands….”143 
B. WEILL AND ROSS GOVERNANCE MODEL 
The DoD does not have an institutionalized governance structure that covers the 
full breadth of responsibilities associated with the business transformation needed to 
establish a permanent enterprise-wide approach to BPR.144  The DoN IT governance 
structure reveals an underdeveloped management foundation incapable of creating and 
                                                 
142 Interview with authors, November 9, 2010. 
143 Interview with authors, November 4, 2010. 
144 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Business Transformation: Achieving Success 
Requires a Chief Management Officer to Provide Focus and Sustained Leadership, GAO-07-1072 
(Washington D.C.: Government Accountability Office, 2007), 4. 
 59
implementing an effective enterprise architecture framework.145  An appropriate 
enterprise architecture framework identifies the “as-is” environment and establishes the 
“to-be” environment and is thus a tool for IT management and organizational 
transformation.146 What the DoN has instead is an informal decision-making structure 
lacking institutional leadership and the management foundation needed for instituting a 
successful enterprise structure.147 
Using the Weill and Ross governance model, we examine the Navy ERP 
governance structure as it exists today.  Our focus is on the key areas that provide the 
basis in developing any IT governance structure: (1) the decision-making domains; (2) 
input and decision-making rights; and (3) decision-making approaches (government 
archetypes). 
1. Decision-Making Domains 
Weill and Ross propose that all enterprises have five fundamental IT decision-
making domains (Figure 6) to consider in implementing and managing the use of a 
strategic IT system.  The governance structure of the Navy ERP Program explicitly 
focuses on two of the five fundamental domains: business application needs and IT 
investment and prioritization.  The decision-making primarily concerns functional 
process owners emphasizing business needs, processes, and exceptions to standards.  The 
Navy ERP Senior Integration Board (NESIB) prioritizes the needs and forwards to the 
resource sponsor for approval.  The other domains are not clearly addressed within the 
hierarchy.  The SME indicated that questions or issues regarding the IT specific decision 
domains (i.e., Principles, Infrastructure, and Architecture) were rarely resolved through 
this hierarchy.  Additionally, none of the responses clearly identified who did make 
decisions regarding those domains.    
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Furthermore, by not specifically addressing the IT specific decision domains, it 
questions the department’s understanding of the role of the DON-CIO.  Where most 
CIO’s in the private sector are actively involved in the enterprise IT decision-making 
process, the DON-CIO is an under-utilized asset for the Navy.  IT decisions should be 
made through the DON-CIO in conjunction with enterprise business process owners, with 
several SME indicating that the DON-CIO should have some role in the Navy ERP 
decision-making. 
Lastly, we point out that the Navy ERP convergence structure (Figure 9) does not 
reflect the role of the acquisition program.  The Navy ERP governance structure exists to 
support the acquisition program guidelines and milestones that must be strictly adhered 
to.  The ultimate decision-making for the Navy ERP Program resides within the realm of 
the acquisition program and resource sponsor. 
2. Input and Decision-Making Rights 
The Navy ERP governance structure affords every stakeholder an opportunity to 
provide input to the decision-making process.  Because of the size and complexity of the 
DoN, providing broad-based input rights for all stakeholders is a logical conclusion.  
Broad based input rights allow users to express concerns and needs, provide ongoing 
feedback, and maintain open lines of communication. 
The existing governance body provides decision rights to all the major 
stakeholders.  Taking this approach is counter-productive, but as several SME noted, this 
was a necessary choice because a major stakeholder who was not provided decision 
rights would cease to cooperate or decline to participate.  Maintaining governance or 
advisory bodies with broad-based decision-making rights does not allow the right 
decision, at the right time, by the right people.  From the experiences of several SME, 
having every stakeholder involved in the decision-making process created a cumbersome 
process which often resulted in no decisions being made.  Additionally, the NESIB is 
considered to be the governance body, but its decision-making authority lies in selecting 
and prioritizing program needs.  Ultimate decision-making authority resides with the 
acquisition program and resource sponsor. 
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3. Decision-Making Approaches 
The Weill and Ross governance model uses government archetypes (Figure 7) to 
classify various IT decision-making approaches.  Within the Navy ERP Program, the 
Federal archetype is the prevalent approach.  The Federal approach is viewed as 
coordinated decision-making across various levels of the organization, and is considered 
to be the most difficult because enterprise leaders and organizational (i.e., command and 
unit level) leaders have differing perspectives.148  The NESIB, the main body in the 
existing governance structure, takes a federated approach to its decision making and often 
causes competing views concerning the Navy ERP Program.  Individual command goals 
often conflict with enterprise level goals and require some level of compromise to move 
forward.  Furthermore, the NESIB does not have an established enterprise level 
perspective to align all of the competing goals, thus complicating an already difficult 
federated approach. 
4. The Navy ERP Governance Hierarchy 
The Navy ERP Program governance structure (Figure 9) is effectively comprised 
of a number of a high level advisory boards.  Final decision-making authority does not 
reside with any of the boards or groups.  The NESIB is considered the Navy ERP 
governing body, but the final decision making is deferred to the governance within the 
acquisition program, and hence lacks an end-to-end business process perspective for 
applying Navy ERP within the DoN enterprise. Furthermore, the SMEs indicated that an 
enterprise IT governance charter has never been finalized for Navy ERP.  Attempts to 
establish a business oriented governance charter have consistently fallen short because 
acquisition milestone requirements throughout the researching, development, testing, and 
evaluation have carried the greatest weight in the decision making. 
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Figure 9.   Navy ERP Governance149 
C. NAVY ERP BEST PRACTICES 
Both private and public best practices are tailored to the individual organization.  
Leaders and managers must evaluate current business processes, value the cost of change 
in their organization, and establish the necessary milestones to implement a 
comprehensive ERP roadmap for success.  However, organizations often overlook many 
of the non-technical requirements to effectively leverage the enterprise capabilities of the 
ERP software.  Successful implementations properly address process management, 
governance, and other nontechnical concerns.150  Furthermore, the scope of the 
governance structure goes beyond successful implementation of the IT infrastructure, and 
focuses on business process improvements and upgrades for the life of the ERP program. 
 
                                                 
149 Program Executive Office of Enterprise Information Systems, “Navy ERP Program: Brief for DLA 
Finance Process Review Committee Meeting,” Defense Logistics Agency, (November 2009): 7, 
www.dla.mil/j-6/dlmso/Archives/Finance/meetings/19Nov09/PRC_Brief.ppt. 
150 Jim Welch and Dmitry Kordysh, “Seven Keys to ERP Success,” Strategic Finance 89, no.3 
(September 2007): 41. 
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SMEs were provided a list of best practices derived from Nah, Lau, and Kuang’s 
research on implementation critical factors.  The respondents were asked to rank the 
relative importance of the given best practices with regards to Navy ERP.  Comparisons 
of the mean respondents’ rankings to the occurrence of critical factors in research from 
Table 1 are provided below (Table 8).  A high level of similarity exists between the SME 
group and our literature review in addressing the importance of governance over 
technical functions.  However, we do see significant deviation with the importance of a 
project champion in the DoN versus private companies.  Table 8 distinguishes Navy ERP 
































Navy ERP 7 3 2 4 5 9 6 8 10 1
RESEARCH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Table 8.   Importance of Factors in Navy ERP vs. Nah, Lau, and Kuang’s Research 
1. Strategic Vision/Goals 
The DoN decentralized leadership structure is effective in fulfilling the needs of 
the warfighter, but makes it challenging to institute an enterprise level business solution.  
Navy ERP requires standardized processes crossing multiple domains in order to achieve 
an integrated, end-to-end enterprise solution.  This can only occur if the project champion 
has enough vested interest and sufficient authority to force domain owners to comply 
with the Navy ERP program.  The project champion holds domain and process owners 
accountable from the Echelon I level and below.  The SMEs suggested the DoN CMO as 
a likely candidate for project champion.  Furthermore, the SMEs proposed the creation of 
an Enterprise Business Office responsible for overseeing the end-to-end business 
processes of the DoN enterprise.  The primary role of the business office would be to 
support the project champion (i.e, DoN CMO) in developing, standardizing, and 




team would be critical to ensuring sufficient knowledge and effective interaction among 
the numerous domain and process owners.  To that end, the team must include technical 
as well as business process experts. 
From the four pilots to the present Navy ERP convergence, the overarching 
strategic vision for Navy ERP still remains unclear to many stakeholders.  Table 4 gives 
the best indication of the future of Navy ERP through FY2012.  At the completion of the 
current program of record, Navy ERP will manage 53.8% of the Navy Total Obligation 
Authority (TOA) which is approximately $85 billion.151  Interviewees agreed that Navy 
ERP will continue implementation to new commands past FY2012, but whether or not 
the entire financial system will be aligned with Navy ERP is still to be determined.  This 
begs the question of how the DoN will be able to provide auditable financial reports by 
2017 if the financial management capability of the Navy ERP program is not 
implemented across the Navy?  An end-to-end enterprise architecture must be developed 
to fully realize the capabilities of the SAP software.  A clear business plan and vision can 
assist in establishing a change management culture and promote BPR efforts by 
providing employees a strategic outlook, timeline, achievable goals, and expected 
benefits. 
BPR and minimum customization is a huge problem that both the ERP PM and 
process owners deal with.  The ERP PM attempts to optimize the ERP system by limiting 
interfaces and legacy processes while process owners fight to retain trusted operational 
practices that negatively affect the strategic vision of the enterprise.  The decentralized 
organizational structure of the Navy allowed for a myriad of redundant systems that will 
eventually be captured within the ERP software and standardized across the enterprise.  
Monitoring and evaluation of performance is another extension of the ERP team 
which ensures a performance standard is set and obtained to achieve the goals of the 
business plan and vision.  Both private and public sectors share similar responsibilities. 
                                                 




The Navy ERP project champion would also play a key role ensuring top 
management support from the major domain and process owners.  Interviewees believed 
that top management support in the early stages of the convergence architecture was 
inconsistent among the major domain owners (e.g., SYSCOMs), but has exhibited 
improvement as Navy ERP is implemented in new commands and as existing ERP 
commands begin to understand the full capabilities of an enterprise business solution.  
This leads to the point that employees must be engaged and understand that Navy ERP is 
a top priority of their command as well as the DoN.  Top management support is vital in 
ensuring that changes in processes, structures, and responsibilities are implemented so 
that every command leverages the new capabilities of the ERP system. SYSCOM 
Commanders, the program sponsor, and the Secretariat were identified as the leaders 
most responsible for top management support. 
It is critical that Navy ERP form a diverse team of experts composed of business, 
technical, and military representatives to ensure efficient and effective ERP 
implementation.  The ERP team must be able to capture the requirements of the war 
fighter while maximizing the capabilities of the ERP system.  Navy ERP is a very 
technical investment which attempts to leverage the business capabilities of the ERP 
software to support a diverse group of war fighters and requirements.  However, Navy 
ERP struggles to standardize business process across the enterprise which optimizes the 
software.  Although much better than four separate pilot programs, the process has been 
very expensive and limited implementation efficiencies have been gained. 
Effective project management is a direct result of a well-organized team that can 
manage resources, standardize business processes, and mitigate failures to maintain the 
implementation timeline.  COOs, CFOs, and CIOs of the private sector ensure efficient 
ERP implementation which optimizes ERP capabilities and minimizes the investment.  
Navy ERP faces the constant struggle of supporting the warfighter above obtaining 




private industry while the DoN focuses on military capability.  PMs have additional 
constraints of meeting acquisition requirements that private sector implementations don’t 
have. 
3. Culture 
Change management was an issue long before the inception of the ERP pilot 
programs.  Since SYSCOMs were already focused on maximizing efficiencies within 
their respective domains, the aspect of re-designing organizationally efficient processes 
to support a standardized way of doing business across the enterprise was seen as taking a 
step back backward.  Top management support is required to establish the acceptable 
behaviors and business practices, while continuously identifying and communicating the 
long term benefits of the Navy ERP program.  Understanding how current processes will 
be executed in the Navy ERP system removes ambiguity and facilitates the 
transformation process.  Additionally, change management must establish a culture in 
which stakeholders are encouraged to take ownership of and assist in improving the end-
to-end business processes of the DoN.  The leadership must educate and train users so 
they maximize the functionality of Navy ERP.  The SYSCOM commanders, the program 
sponsor, and the Secretariat were viewed as the leaders responsible for implementing 
change management in conjunction with BPR efforts. 
Effective communication is a vital medium of every organization especially one 
implementing radical changes to day to day operations.  Navy ERP uses effective 
communication modes to inform, update, and educate stakeholders about benefits and 
improvements to the enterprise as well as obtain critical feedback on the enterprise. 
4. Political Influence 
Navy ERP has to appease many stakeholders outside of the Navy.  Private sector 
implementations do not deal with the politics of resource funding and constant 
government accountability.  The private sector project champion focuses on efficient 
implementation of the ERP software.  If the DoN CMO is eventually identified as Navy 
ERP’s project champion, he will have to balance efficient ERP implementation with 
changing government regulations. 
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Current acquisition regulations increase the scrutiny of Navy ERP by categorizing 
the program as an ACAT 1AM program.  This requires many long range ERP decisions 
to be finalized by individuals several times removed from the experts who fully 
understand and manage the enterprise vision.  Although software development, testing 
and troubleshooting are critical steps in both private and public sector implementations, 
the added layer of acquisition politics decrease the efficiencies often gained in the private 
sector. 
D. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS 
Our framework looked at DoN characteristics derived from four focus areas: (1) 
Strategic Vision/Goals, (2) Structure, (3) Culture, and (4) Political Influence.  During the 
course of our research we discovered that the characteristics did not equally affect the 
governance of the Navy ERP Program.  The factors are presented in a Venn diagram 
(Figure 10) to exhibit the mutual effect and relative importance across the focus areas. 
Traits with the most overlap are identified as having the greatest effect on the 
governance of the program.  The SME interviews were key in substantiating the effect of 
our posited characteristics on the governance of the Navy ERP Program.  The influence 
of the characteristics in each focus area was determined by SME responses which 
identified focus areas in addition to the primary areas we associated with each 
characteristic.  Of all the characteristics examined, leadership and goal clarity were the 
most significant factors affecting the governance of the program.   
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Figure 10.   DoN Characteristics Affecting ERP Governance 
The following is a brief description of the issues associated with the 
characteristics that are significant in three or more of our focus areas: 
 Leadership Issues: (1) Lack of sustained executive level support; (2) 
Minimal departmental commitment to the program; (3) Inability to cut 
across departmental and cultural boundaries; (4) Inability to promote 
needed organizational change; and (5) Legally mandated positions (e.g., 
DON-CIO) not actively involved in the enterprise. 
 Goal Clarity Issues: (1) Missing an enterprise level strategic vision; (2) 
Does not define measureable goals and objectives for the enterprise; (3) 
Competing goals across the systems commands and other organizational 
entities; and (4) Conflict between military and political goals. 
 Rank vs. Position Issues: (1) Positional authority insufficient in 
overcoming rank hierarchy and (2) Inadequate delegation of decision-
making rights. 
 Roles and Accountability Issues: (1) Roles and responsibilities of 
individuals and governing bodies not clearly defined; (2) Advisory vs. 
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decision-making entities; and (3) No forcing function to hold people 
accountable to the enterprise initiatives. 
 Organization vs. Unit Goal Issues: (1) Autonomy allows for establishing 
goals that may not support enterprise goals; (2) Focus on maximizing 
efficiency at the unit level; and (3) cultural norms established at the unit 
level do not support enterprise level goals. 
 Motivation Issues: (1) Focus of many users is on unit level objectives; (2) 
Business processes considered to be less important, back-office functions; 
and (3) No incentive to learn a new system. 
 Modernization vs. Transformation Issues: (1) Primarily technology 
implementation vice BPR and (2) Strong resistance to change ingrained 
business practices. 
 Transparency Issues: (1) Not sharing information is a cultural norm; (2) 
Perception that sharing information results in a loss of power; and (3) 
Only negatively perceived benefits for improving transparency of unit and 
organizational business practices. 
 Formal Program Issues: (1) External processes and entities to the DoN; 
(2) Acquisition based governance approach; and (3)  Acquisition programs 
do not incorporate business objectives or BPR efforts into the milestone 
requirements. 
We also note a correlation between our posited characteristics and the SME 
recommended best practices (Table 8).  The top five best practices are listed from most to 
least important along with the problem areas we believe they can have the greatest effect 
on:  
 Project Champion (Leadership),  
 Top Management Support (Leadership, Rank vs. Position, and Roles and 
Accountability)  
 Business Plan and Vision (Goal Clarity, Roles and Accountability, 
Organization vs. Unit Goals, and Formal Programs)   
 Change Management Program and Culture (Motivation and 
Transparency),  
 BPR and Minimum Customization (Modernization vs. Transformation and 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
Many large-scale ERP IT systems have been hindered by numerous 
implementation challenges and Navy ERP is no exception.  Though the origins of ERP in 
the private sector date back to the 1960s, the use of ERP in the public sector is still in its 
infancy.  Most of the knowledge base is developed from lessons learned and best 
practices of private companies. 
Existing research suggests that similarities exist between public and private sector 
organizations that warrant the use of ERP IT systems in public and or non-profit 
organizations.  However, in the case of the DoN ERP system implementation, we posit 
that the DoN is a public sector entity with unique characteristics that should be 
considered in developing an appropriate IT governance structure for the Navy ERP 
Program. 
We utilize two tools to analyze the DoN characteristics and existing Navy ERP IT 
governance structure: a public sector analysis framework and an IT governance model.  
From our literature review of public sector theories, we developed an analysis framework 
for examining public sector characteristics of the DoN that may influence the governance 
of the Navy ERP Program.  With respect to the IT governance model, we selected the 
Weill and Ross IT model to analyze the existing Navy ERP Program governance 
structure.   
Our analysis identified several areas of interest concerning the affect of DoN 
specific characteristics on governance of the Navy ERP Program.  Based on the initial 
findings, we developed a series of open-ended questions to confirm the existence of the 
influencing factors in the Navy ERP Program governance structure.  We conducted 
interviews with SME from BTA, DON-CIO, PEO-EIS, ASN FM&C, OPNAV staff, the 
resource sponsor, and two private sector companies.  The interviews validated our 
hypothesis that there are DoN specific characteristics that significantly influence the 
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governance of the Navy ERP Program and therefore the characteristics must be 
considered when implementing best practices and BPR methods taken from the private 
sector.  Our results are summarized in Table 9. 
DoN Specific 
Characteristics Challenges Associated with the Characteristic
"Best Practice" to 
Address Challenge
Leadership
(1) Lack of sustained executive level support; (2) Minimal 
departmental commitment to the program; (3) Inability to cut 
across departmental and cultural boundaries; (4) Inability to 
promote needed organizational change; and (5) Legally 






(1) Missing an enterprise level strategic vision; (2) Does not 
define measureable goals and objectives for the enterprise; 
(3) Competing goals across the systems commands and 
other organizational entities; and (4) Conflict between military 
and political goals.
Business Plan and 
Vision
Rank vs. Position
(1) Positional authority insufficient in overcoming rank 






(1) Roles and responsibilities of individuals and governing 
bodies not clearly defined; (2) Advisory vs. decision making 
entities; and (3) No forcing function to hold people 






(1) Autonomy allows for establishing goals that may not 
support enterprise goals; (2) Focus on maximizing efficiency 
at the unit level; and (3) Cultural norms established at the unit 
level do not support enterprise level goals.
Business Plan and 
Vision
Motivation
(1) Focus of many users is on unit level objectives; (2) 
Business processes considered to be less important, back-





(1) Primarily technology implementation vice BPR; and (2) 
Strong resistance to change ingrained business practices. BPR and Minimum 
Customization
Transparency
(1) Not sharing information is a  cultural norm; (2) Perception 
that sharing information results in a  loss of power; and (3) 
Only negatively perceived benefits for improving 




(1) External processes and entities to the DoN; (2) 
Acquisition based governance approach; and (3)  Acquisition 
programs do not incorporate business objectives or BPR 
efforts into the milestone requirements.
Business Plan and 
Vision; BPR and 
Minimum 
Customization  
Table 9.   DoN Specific Characteristics, Associated Issues, and Recommended Best 
Practices 
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B. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
What are the Qualitative Differences Between DoN and Private Sector 
Governance Structures that Affect the Strategic Planning, Implementation, 
and Policy Formulation of Enterprise-Wide IT Systems? 
The enterprise IT governance structure in the Navy is more technology than 
business focused.  The foundations of the existing governance board are rooted with the 
acquisition program of the Navy ERP convergence.  The result is a strategic focus on 
supporting milestone decisions in the deployment of the IT technology, and minimal 
emphasis on BPR which must go hand in hand when implementing an enterprise business 
solution.   
Ultimately, the acquisition governance structure validates Navy ERP as if it were 
another program that can be successfully rolled out by meeting the program requirements 
at the different milestone reviews.  This governance structure is sufficient in delivering a 
new weapon system, aircraft, missile, etc. that is readily acceptable and useable, and 
aligned with the strategic objectives of the DoN.  However, in implementing an 
enterprise-wide IT system as part of a business transformation effort, Navy ERP 
governance fails to provide several structural elements exhibited in successful 
implementations: 
 Business focused strategic vision with enterprise level goals and objectives. 
 Consistent business focused C-level equivalent review, support, and 
accountability mechanism. 
 Clearly defined roles and responsibilities within the existing governance 
structure. 
 Establishing end-to-end business process owners and ensuring sufficient 
decision-making rights provided to the business enterprise leaders. 
 BPR focus on establishing standard business practices across the enterprise. 
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C. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What Entities, Internal and External to the Navy, Contribute to IT 
Policy Formulation, Implementation, and Enforcement? 
Internally, the DoN is a stove-piped organization with domains which are in 
constant competition for limited resources.  Within each domain are a number of 
organizations and commands with separate goals and objectives (e.g., NAVSEA and 
NAVAIR have different objectives, and within NAVAIR fixed-wing versus rotary 
aircraft have different missions).  As a result, domain and process owners must be 
provided equal decision-making rights in order for Navy ERP to attain a working level of 
cooperation.  The trade-off is that competing agendas do not support enterprise level 
decision making and policy formulation.  Additionally, internal regulation by system 
users across all levels of the DoN influence the program governance in that: (1) they do 
not conform to standardized business practices, and (2) they maintain legacy systems 
requiring complex interfaces with Navy ERP COTS software. 
Externally, the DoN is influenced by DoD policies and directives, acquisition 
oversight, government watchdog organizations (e.g., GAO and DoD IG), and federal 
statute and rule.  The myriad of legal requirements negatively impact IT governance by 
introducing a significant number of potentially competing requirements and goals.  Also, 
the Navy ERP Program is funded with congressional appropriations.  This requires a high 
level of transparency which invites increased scrutiny by the public which can affect the 
Congressional oversight and guidance provided to the program. 
2. Who is Responsible for Developing the DoN’s ERP Requirements and 
How are They Selected to Participate? 
The Navy ERP requirements were predominantly focused on meeting 
requirements from an acquisition perspective for the program.  Figure 9 exhibits the 
complicated and cumbersome hierarchy used to determine Navy ERP requirements.  
Proposed requirements flow from the various working groups and process owners.  The 
requirements are ultimately fielded by the NESIB and priorities are established through 
consensus.  However, competing objectives among the NESIB members sub-optimizes 
the decision making as more often than not members agree to disagree and or have to 
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consider trade-offs with other board members which negatively impact the ability to 
develop enterprise level decisions.  In essence, the lack of a strategic vision, ill-defined 
roles and responsibilities, and rank and positional authority of the domains’ leadership 
resulted in all domain owners participating in the input phase and decision-making 
phases.  As was the norm, the selection of participants was dictated by the need to 
appease each major domain and process owner in order to create an amicable working 
environment. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. For DoN 
The following are proposed recommendations for improving the governance 
structure and overcoming the implementation challenges of the Navy ERP Program: 
 Appoint a Navy ERP Project Champion who has end-to-end enterprise 
responsibility and requisite authority to command compliance across all levels 
of the DoN enterprise.  The DCMO for the Navy was identified by several 
SME as an appropriate champion. 
 Establish an Enterprise Business Office staffed with a balance of technical, 
business, and military experts responsible for implementing the DoN’s 
business plan, validating end-to-end business processes, and establishing 
appropriate performance metrics.  The DON-CIO is a position which several 
SME identified as being under-utilized in the Navy ERP Program. 
 Create a business oriented strategic vision and establish a governance charter 
clearly defining roles and responsibilities to support the vision.   Also, assign 
decision rights and sufficient authority to those people who will be held 
accountable for the program. 
 Incentivize ERP compliance by including it as a part of performance 
evaluations for applicable civilian and uniformed personnel. 
 Propose a new or streamlined IT acquisition process which allows mature IT 
programs to gain efficiencies by accelerating decision authority, especially 
when expanding an already proven system. 
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2. Areas for Future Research 
During the course of our research we identified other issues which were beyond 
the original scope of our work and require further investigation.  Those issues revolve 
around the following areas:   
 What specific governance characteristics associated with the DoD 
acquisition system make it more, or less, effective in implementing an 
enterprise level IT solution such as Navy ERP? 
 What is the definition of return on investment (ROI) for the business 
process re-engineering (BPR) efforts of the DoN? What performance 
metrics can be established for analyzing the effectiveness of BPR efforts 
within the DoN? 
 Compare governance structures of ERP implementations across the federal 
government to create a database identifying best practices and potentially 
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